Legislative Clarification of the Correlative Rights of Surface and Mineral Owners by Dycus, J. Stephen
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 33 
Issue 4 Issue 4 - May 1980 Article 2 
5-1980 
Legislative Clarification of the Correlative Rights of Surface and 
Mineral Owners 
J. Stephen Dycus 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Land Use Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
J. Stephen Dycus, Legislative Clarification of the Correlative Rights of Surface and Mineral Owners, 33 
Vanderbilt Law Review 871 (1980) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol33/iss4/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
Legislative Clarification of the
Correlative Rights of Surface and
Mineral Owners
J. Stephen Dycus*
Millions of acres of land in this country are owned by persons
who do not hold title to the underlying minerals. Because the min-
eral owner usually cannot extract the minerals without occupying
or destroying some part of the surface, the rule has developed that
he can use whatever means are "reasonable and necessary" for that
purpose, with "due regard" for the rights of the surface owner. In
the absence of any express agreement, the parties to a mineral
deed or lease are deemed to have intended the creation of an ease-
ment in the mineral owner.
Until recently, this state of the law probably reflected the ex-
pectations of both mineral and surface owners in most cases. With
the development of new and more destructive mining technologies,
however, and the widening search for new sources of raw materials,
especially for energy, the scope of the mineral owner's easement
has been increasingly questioned. Uncertainty over rights to use or
destroy the surface has caused conflict between more and more
mineral and surface owners, fomenting litigation and discouraging
the full development of either mineral or surface estates.
A number of recent court decisions have severely limited the
mineral owner's rights to use destructive mining techniques, and
legislation in several states now requires the explicit consent of the
surface owner to destroy the surface. Yet none of these decisions or
statutes deals comprehensively with the extraction of all minerals
or with all mining processes. In a large number of cases neither the
surface owner nor the mineral owner can make a reliable estimate
of the value or usefulness of his estate.
This Article examines the development of the judge-made doc-
trine of the dominant mineral owner, then considers the various
legislative efforts to restrict or clarify the application of that doc-
trine. With this background it then proposes a new, more compre-
hensive statutory solution, which requires a clear expression of
* Associate Professor, Vermont Law School. B.A., 1963, LL.B., 1965, Southern Method-
ist University; LL.M., Harvard University, 1976. The author is grateful for the excellent
assistance of Peter Golding, a third-year student at Vermont Law School. Professor Dean
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understanding about the effect of any mining activity upon the
surface of the land. Constitutional implications of the different
statutory schemes are identified and briefly discussed at the end of
the Article.
I. THE DOMINANT MINERAL OWNER
The owner of a severed mineral estate has long been character-
ized as "dominant" in relation to the owner of the surface estate.
The general rule today, with certain exceptions, is as follows:
The [mineral] owner has the right to mine even though the grant or
reservation contains no express mining clause. The right to mine ... is
incident to the ownership thereof; he has the right to use the surface in
a manner fairly necessary to the enjoyment of the mineral estate. When
a thing is granted, all the means to obtain it and all the fruits and
effects of it are also granted.'
Without any explicit agreement between the surface and mineral
owners, the mere fact of ownership of the minerals is said to carry
with it the right to use so much of the surface as is necessary to
recover the minerals; that right is implied by law.'
The doctrine found its origins and terminology in the common-
law easement of necessity.' The ownership of property is, of course,
a nullity without the means to use and enjoy it.' "For practical
purposes," Justice Holmes said, "the right to coal consists in the
right to mine it." ' The characterization of the mineral owner as
"dominant" therefore reflects the natural expectations of the par-
ties that some portion of the surface may have to be used to recover
1. See Squires v. Lafferty, 95 W.Va. 307, 309, 121 S.E. 90, 91 (1924).
2. The "dominant mineral owner" doctrine and its development are described in 1 E.
KuNTz, On. AND GAS § 3.2 (1962); 3 C. LINDLEY, Mums § 813 (1914); 4 W. SUMMERS, OIL AND
GAS § 652 (Flittie ed. 1975); 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 218 to 218.14
(1978); Brimmer, The Rancher's Subservient Estate, 5 LAND AND WATER L. REv. 49 (1970);
Cassin, Land Uses Permitted an Oil and Gas Lessee, 37 TEx. L. REv. 889 (1959); Davis,
Selected Problems Regarding Lessee's Rights and Obligations to the Surface Owner, 8 RocKy
MTN. Mm. L. INST. 315 (1963); Ferguson, Severed Surface and Mineral Estates-Right to
Use, Damage or Destroy the Surface to Recover Minerals, 19 ROcKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 411
(1974); Gray, A New Appraisal of the Rights of Lessees Under Oil and Gas Leases to Use
and Occupy the Surface, 20 RocKy MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 227 (1975); Lambert, Surface Rights
of the Oil and Gas Lessee, 11 OKLA. L. REV. 373 (1958); Patton, Recent Changes in the
Correlative Rights of Surface and Mineral Owners, 18 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 19 (1973);
Comment, The Common Law Rights to Subjacent Support and Surface Preservation, 38
Mo. L. REV. 234 (1973); Note, Construction of Deeds Granting the Right to Strip Mine, 40
U. Cm. L. REV. 304 (1971); Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d 383 (1976).
3. 3 C. LINDLEY, MINES § 813 (1914); 3 R. PowFLL, REAL PROPERTY 410 (1979); 1 H.
WLAMS & C. MEYES, OIL AND GAS LAw § 218.2 (1978); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 513,
comment b, Illustration 1 (1944).
4. See Simonton, Ways By Necessity, 25 COLUM. L. REv. 571 (1925).
5. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
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the minerals.
So long as the pick and shovel remained the prevalent means
of mining, the doctrine of the dominant mineral owner probably
functioned with some measure of fairness. When the surface and
mineral estates were severed, the parties usually could form expec-
tations based upon personal experience with the need to use the
surface to recover the minerals, and with the physical effects of
mining upon the land. As recently as the middle of this century
both parties probably knew what was involved, for example, in the
operation of a deep coal mine or a stone quarry, and were thus
prepared to bargain knowledgeably about their respective rights.
At its outset, at least, the dominance doctrine seems to have
'operated as a shorthand way of conveyancing-a procedure
adopted for the convenience of both parties to avoid long technical
descriptions in deeds. Within reasonable limits, it also afforded the
mineral owner some flexibility in his operations. Since both parties
had reason to know the consequences of their reliance on the domi-
nance doctrine, the doctrine may be likened to the incorporation of
custom into dealings between merchants. The doctrine developed,
in other words, precisely because both parties understood what was
involved. The parties, of course, did not have to rely on this legal
implication to describe their relationship. It was common more
than a hundred years ago, as it is today, for the rights of mineral
owners to be spelled out in elaborate detail in a deed or lease.,
Many of the largest mineral owners adopted printed form deeds
which included such language.7
The dominance doctrine took on new meaning, however, with
the coming of the Industrial Revolution. During that period of
rapid economic growth and social change the availability of raw
materials was perceived as an urgent public necessity, justifying
the sacrifice of the land. An 1893 Pennsylvania Supreme Court
opinion suggests, with some emotion, that by restricting access to
the minerals
6. For example, Mahon's predecessor in title acquired his home by such a form deed
from the coal company in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). F. BoS-
SELMAN, D. CALLiES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 130 (1973). For a modem example, see
CONTINENTAL OIL COMPANY, LANDMAN'S LEGAL HANDBOOK: A PRAcTIcAL GUIDE IN LEASING FOR
OIL AND GAS 121 (1957). Note, however, that such explicit language may put the mineral
purchaser at a competitive disadvantage.
7. The infamous "broad form" deeds used in Eastern Kentucky around the turn of the
century contained extensive language purporting to save the mineral owner from any claim
for damages. Schneider, Strip Mining in Kentucky, 59 Ky. L.J. 652, 653-57 (1971); Note,
Broad-Form Deed-Obstacle to Peaceful Coexistence Between Mineral and Surface Owners,
60 KY. L.J. 742 (1972); Note, Kentucky's Experience with the Broad-Form Deed, 63 Ky.
L.J. 107 (1975).
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the public might be debarred the use of the hidden treasures which the
great laboratory of nature has provided for man's use in the bowels of
the earth. Some of them, at least, are necessary to his comfort. Coal,
oil, gas, and iron are absolutely essential to our common comfort and
prosperity. To place them beyond the reach of the public would be a
great public wrong . . . . [The question we are considering becomes of
a quasi public character. It is not to be treated as a mere contest be-
tween A. and B. over a little comer of earth.'
If the desire to protect rights of private property ownership played
a prominent role in judicial decisions of the day, a belief in the
need for economic expansion and industrial growth was even
stronger. Thus, the courts have sometimes expanded the rights of
mineral owners by characterizing almost any mining technique as
"necessary" and therefore permissible.'
Since the Second World War, the development of very large
earthmoving equipment and other advances in mining technology
have permitted the profitable recovery of many mineral deposits
which previously would have been left undisturbed. Increasing de-
mand for all kinds of raw materials, changing patterns of consump-
tion, and the discovery of new materials, like uranium, have also
encouraged the wider use of destructive mining techniques.
Thus, while the intent and the need of the parties formed the
basis for implying an easement in favor of the mineral owner,"0 the
application of these two criteria has caused the courts considerable
difficulty. Conflicting concerns based in the public interest have in-
creased this problem. As Professor Powell points out:
[Wihether easements by necessity are believed to be products of public
policy or to be the embodiments of inferences as to the intent of the
parties, they should be establishable by proof that they are necessary to
the reasonable utilization of the claiming dominant parcel. Only so can
the public interest in land utilization be safeguarded. Only so can the
probable intent of the parties be effectuated."
Almost before the courts fully articulated the dominance doctrine,
they began to modify it in a number of ways.
In many cases the courts faced an irreconcilable inconsistency
in the notion that a person would pay valuable consideration for
8. Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. 286, 297-98, 25 A. 597, 599 (1893).
9. "To encourage the development of the great natural resources of a country trifling
inconveniences to particular persons must sometimes give way to the necessities of a great
community." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 149, 6 A. 453, 459 (1886).
The same sentiment is echoed today. The ongoing "energy crisis" and the economic reces-
sion of the late seventies have placed a renewed emphasis on economic development at the
expense of the land and other values.
10. Wilkes-Barre Township School Dist. v. Corgan, 403 Pa. 383, 386, 170 A.2d 97, 98
(1961).
11. 3 R. Powm, REAL PROPERTY 410 (1979).
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the surface estate and perhaps make improvements on it, with the
knowledge that it could be arbitrarily destroyed by the mineral
owner. It would be "extremely unreasonable," the Arkansas Su-
preme Court noted in Carson v. Missouri Pacific Railroad,12 to
conclude that "the railroad would have had the right (assuming
that bauxite was to be removed by the open pit method), the day
after Carson paid for his farm home, to enter upon it and utterly
destroy its value without liability . . . ."' Such an extreme result,
in the absence of a clear understanding between the parties, would
amount to a finding that the surface owner had no estate except by
the sufferance of the mineral owner. Instead, one should assume
that each party intended to be left with some valuable right. 4 The
usual rule is that a reservation as extensive as a grant is void for
repugnancy; 5 the same is true of a grant that encompasses all that
is purported to be reserved. 6 When the rights of the mineral owner
are so broad that they are equivalent to ownership of the surface,
they are inconsistent with the existence of a separate estate in the
surface. 7 It is unlikely that the parties would fail to mention a
matter of such gravity as the destruction of the surface estate, if
they intended to permit that destruction. It seems more likely that
they did not think of this problem at all.'8
The separate dignity of the surface estate is also recognized in
those cases establishing the surface owner's right to subjacent sup-
port." The rule is that deep mining must be conducted so as not to
12. 212 Ark. 963, 209 S.W.2d 97 (1948).
13. Id. at 967, 209 S.W.2d at 99.
14. See Commerce Union Bank v. Kinkade, 540 S.W.2d 861, 868-69 (Ky. 1976) (Ste-
phenson, J., concurring); Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas Co., 38 Ohio St. 2d 244, 313 N.E.2d
374 (1974); Wilkes-Barre Township School Dist. v. Corgan, 403 Pa. 383, 170 A.2d 97 (1961);
Mellor v. Conklin Limestone Co., 99 R.I. 84, 205 A.2d 831 (1964). "When a general grant or
reservation is made of all minerals without qualifying language, it should be reasonably as-
sumed that the parties intended to sever the entire mineral estate from the surface estate,
leaving the owner of each with definite incidents of ownership enjoyable in distinctly differ-
ent manners." Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107, 112
(1949), quoted with approval in Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971).
15. Carson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 212 Ark. 963, 209 S.W.2d 97 (1948); Foster v. Runk,
109 Pa. 291, 2 A. 25 (1885); Dorrell v. Collins, Cro. Eliz. 6 (1582).
16. Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 349 (Tex. 1971).
17. "To construe the 'right to use' as including the right to strip mine would be to
pervert the basic purpose of a principle designed to mutually accommodate the owner of the
mineral estate and the owner of the surface estate in the enjoyment of their separate proper-
ties." Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas Co., 38 Ohio St. 2d 244, 313 N.E.2d 374, 377 n.1 (1974). In
Benton v. U.S. Manganese Corp., 229 Ark. 181, 313 S.W.2d 839 (1958), it was held that even
where the right to strip mine was clear and the surface owner purchased with full knowledge,
the mineral owner had to pay damages for complete destruction of the surface, since to hold
otherwise would make the conveyance a nullity.
18. Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107, 112 (1949).
19. Harris v. Ryding, 151 Eng. Rep. 27 (Ex. 1839); W. LANE & J. ROBERTs, THE PRINCI-
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cause the overlying surface or adjoining lands to subside or cave
in."0 The right of support is absolute.2' Although the surface owner
may explicitly waive the right, it has been held that general lan-
guage in a mineral deed granting broad rights to use the surface 2
or waiving damages will not constitute a full waiver of this right.23
In general, when the parties have an explicit and unequivocal
agreement concerning their respective rights to use the surface,
that agreement will be given effect, absent fraud or other vitiating
circumstances.24 When, however, the instrument severing the min-
eral and surface estates is silent or its terms are ambiguous, the
courts have employed a wonderful variety of tactics to try to "dis-
cover" what the parties intended. 25 For example, a substantial
body of case law has developed to define the term "minerals" in an
instrument of conveyance. 2 More particularly, the question has
arisen whether the grant or reservation of one kind of mineral, or
simply "minerals," includes the right to conduct surface mining for
a substance not specifically named. 2 The widespread use of stan-
dard form deeds and leases has been a fertile source of litigation in
PLES OF SUBSIDENCE AND THE LAW OF SUPPORT IN RELATION TO COLLIERY UNDERTAKING (1929).
Like the other limitations of the dominance doctrine, the subjacent support rule was a re-
sponse to widespread abuse. It had its origins in the cemmon-law right of lateral support.
See 5 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 699-703 (1979).
20. Humphries v. Brodgen, 116 Eng. Rep. 1048 (Q.B. 1850); Montgomery, The Devel-
opment of the Right of Subjacent Support and the "Third Estate" in Pennsylvania, 25
TEMP. L.Q. 1 (1951); Twitty, Law of Subjacent Support and the Right to Totally Destroy
Surface in Mining Operations, 6 ROCKY MTN. MTN. L. INST. 497 (1961); Comment, The Com-
mon Law Rights to Subjacent Support and Surface Preservation, 38 Mo. L. REv. 234 (1973).
21. Smith v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 347 Pa. 290, 32 A.2d 227 (1943). Contra, Colorado
Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Salardino, 115 Colo. 516, 245 P.2d 461 (1952).
22. Williams v. Hay, 120 Pa. 485, 14 A. 379 (1888).
23. Dignan v. Altoona Coal and Coke Co., 222 Pa. 390, 71 A. 845 (1909). "The signifi-
cance of subjacent support as a means of analysis lies in the fact that all jurisdictions except
Kentucky which have upheld the right of subjacent support have also refused the right to
strip mine." Note, Alternative Approaches to Analyzing the Intent of the Parties Upon Sev-
erance of Mineral and Surface Estates in Iowa, 60 IowA L. REv. 1365, 1378 (1975).
24. Tokas v. J.J. Arnold Co., 122 W. Va. 613, 11 S.E.2d 759 (1940).
25. Ferguson, Severed Surface and Mineral Estates-Right to Use, Damage or Destroy
the Surface to Recover Minerals, 19 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 411 (1974); Comment, The
Common Law Rights to Subjacent Support and Surface Preservation, 38 Mo. L. REv. 234
(1973); Note, Construction of Deeds Granting the Right to Strip Mine, 40 U. Cnm. L. Rav.
304 (1971).
26. Emery, What Surface is Mineral and What Mineral is Surface, 12 OKLA. L. REv.
499 (1959); Ingraham, The Meaning of "Minerals" in Grants and Reservations, 30 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. REv. 343 (1948). See 1 E. KUNTE, OIL AND GAS § 13.3 (1962); 1A W. SUMMERS,
OIL AND GAS § 135 (1975); 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 219 (1970). "We are
inclined to believe that in most of these cases of unnamed minerals which later become very
valuable, the subsequent controversy decides which party will be enriched by a substance
which took no part in the intention or bargaining of the parties to the instrument of
conveyance."Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Tex. 1977).
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this area.
In many cases, the important question, however, is not the
ownership of a particular mineral substance or the mining process
to be employed, but the condition of the land after mining. Indeed,
some courts have gone to great lengths to couch their decisions in
terms of ownership of the minerals when their plain purpose was to
avoid the destruction of the surface estate.2s Thus in Acker v.
Guinn the Texas Supreme Court stated, "Unless the contrary in-
tention is affirmatively and fairly expressed, . . .a grant or reser-
vation of 'minerals' or 'mineral rights' should not be construed to
include a substance that must be removed by methods that will, in
effect, consume or deplete the surface estate. 29 This approach, of
course, raises the possibility that ownership of a particular mineral
deposit will be dependent upon the "mineral" owner's ability to
recover it without destroying the surface." Ownership of particular
minerals has also been resolved in favor of the surface owner when
the mineral was clearly not the primary concern of the parties,3' or
when the substance had not yet been discovered or was not known
to exist locally.2 Scientific or technical definitions of the term
"mineral" have been utilized.s The courts have also relied upon
various common rules of construction, for example, the doctrine of
ejusdem generis."4
27. Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 787 (1948).
28. Thomas v. Markham & Brown, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 498 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Carson v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 212 Ark. 963, 209 S.W.2d 97 (1948); Kinder v. LaSalle County Carbon
Coal Co., 310 Ill. 126, 141 N.E. 537 (1923); Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
29. 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971). "[The] character of the mining rights granted has
been held to determine the limit of the substance granted ... ." Rock House Fork Land
Co. v. Raleigh Brick & Tile Co., 83 W. Va. 20, 24, 97 S.E. 684, 685 (1918). In the recent case
of Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977), the Texas Supreme Court stated emphatically
that Acker v. Guinn, like Reed v. Wylie, was concerned solely with ownership of the miner-
als. Yet in the earlier case, the court declared that "It is not ordinarily contemplated...
that the utility of the surface for agricultural or grazing purposes will be destroyed or sub-
stantially impaired." 464 S.W.2d at 352.
30. Patton, Recent Changes in the Correlative Rights of Surface and Mineral Owners,
18 RoCmy MTN. MIN. L. INST. 19 (1973). Thus the development of a new nondestructive min-
ing technology might cause the ownership of a deposit to shift from surface owner to mineral
owner. According to Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977), a mineral substance is
owned by the surface owner if he can show that, as of the date of the instrument being
construed, the removal of the mineral would necessarily have consumed or depleted the sur-
face. Id. at 172. See Note, Beneath the Surface-Destruction Test: The Dialectic of Intention
and Policy, 56 Tax. L. REv. 99 (1977).
31. Panhandle Coop. Royalty Co. v. Cunningham, 495 P.2d 108 (Okla. 1971) (oil and
gas).
32. Carson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 212 Ark. 963, 209 S.W.2d 97 (1948)(bauxite).
33. New Mexico and Arizona Land Co. v. Elkins, 137 F. Supp. 767 (D.N.M. 1956)
(uranium and thorium). Contra, Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 514, 217 S.W.2d 995 (1949).
34. E.g., Bumpus v. United States, 325 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1963); Basing v. Ohio Val-
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Many cases have relied upon other language in the deed or
lease to determine what the parties intended, applying the general
rule that the instrument as a whole must support the construction
asserted. 5 For example, the grant of mining rights normally associ-
ated with deep mining has been held not to permit surface min-
ing." When the parties' agreement concentrated on the recovery of
one substance"7 or when it plainly contemplated some continuing
use of the surface," such indications have been controlling. On the
other hand, the destruction of the surface has sometimes been per-
mitted when the deed or lease gave the mineral owner very broad
rights to "dig, excavate or penetrate" any part or all of the land" or
when the surface owner waived any right of payment of damages
for injury to the surface." A variety of other aids to constructon
have been employed, for example, strict construction against the
grantor," or resolution of ambiguities against the draftsman of the
instrument.42
A number of cases have attempted to ascertain intent by refer-
ring to circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument
of severance. 3 Thus, when the mineral to be mined had not been
discovered" or was not known to exist locally," or when surface
mining was not commonly used at the time of the execution,6 de-
ley Coal Co., 155 Ind. App. 527, 293 N.E.2d 510 (1973); Wulf v. Shultz, 211 Kan. 724, 508
P.2d 896 (1973).
35. Panhandle Coop. Royalty Co. v. Cunningham, 495 P.2d 108, 113 (Okla. 1971); New
Charter Coal Co. v. McKee, 411 Pa. 307, 191 A.2d 830, 835 (1963).
36. Franklin v. Callicoat, 53 Ohio Op. 240, 119 N.E.2d 688 (C.P. 1954); Rochez Bros.,
Inc. v. Duricka, 374 Pa. 262, 97 A.2d 825 (1953).
37. New Charter Coal Co. v. McKee, 411 Pa. 307, 191 A.2d 830 (1963); Wilkes-Barre
Township School Dist. v. Corgan, 403 Pa. 383, 170 A.2d 97 (1961).
38. Stewart v. Chernicky, 439 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970); Rochez Bros., Inc. v.
Duricka, 374 Pa. 262, 97 A.2d 825 (1953); Oresta v. Romano Bros., Inc., 137 W. Va. 633, 73
S.E.2d 622 (1952); Rock House Fork Land Co. v. Raleigh Brick & Tile Co., 83 W. Va. 20, 97
S.E. 684 (1918).
39. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 364 Pa. 422, 72 A.2d 568 (1950).
40. Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Ky. 1956); Commonwealth v. Fitzmartin,
376 Pa. 390, 102 A.2d 893 (1954).
41. Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
42. New Charter Coal Co. v. McKee, 411 Pa. 307, 191 A.2d 830 (1963); Zeppa v. Hous-
ton Oil Co., 113 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
43. Stewart v. Chernicky, 439 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970); Oresta v. Romano Bros.,
Inc., 137 W. Va. 633, 73 S.E.2d 622 (1952).
44. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Strohacker, 202 Ark. 645, 152 S.W.2d 557 (1941).
45. Mining Corp. v. International Paper Co., 324 F. Supp. 705, 711 (W.D. Ark. 1971);
Carson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 212 Ark. 963, 209 S.W.2d 97 (1948).
46. Smith v. Moore, 172 Colo. 440, 474 P.2d 794 (1970); English v. Harris Clay Co., 255
N.C. 467, 35 S.E.2d 329 (1945); Phipps v. Leftwich, 216 Va. 706, 222 S.E.2d 536 (1976).
However, the court in Merrill v. Manufacturers Light and Heat Co., 409 Pa. 68, 185 A.2d 573
(1962), found that the use of strip mining in the neighborhood showed that the parties could
[Vol. 33:871
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struction of the surface has not been permitted. The utility or qual-
ity of the land to be mined has also been a factor in determining
the parties' intent.4" The fact that the land was intensively culti-
vated48 or was earmarked for forests or for recreational use49 has
been held to show an intent to preserve the surface in a useful con-
dition. Conversely, surface mining has been permitted on land that
was characterized by the court as rough and barren or unproduc-
tive.50 In any event, the instrument must be given a reasonable
meaning. In the leading Pennsylvania case of Wilkes-Barre Town-
ship School District v. Corgan, the standard of interpretation ap-
plied was "the meaning that would be attached by a reasonably
intelligent person, acquainted with all operative usages, and know-
ing all the circumstances prior to and contemporaneous with the
making of the contract. '51
The most important limitation of the dominance doctrine is
that the mineral owner may do whatever is "reasonable and neces-
sary" for the extraction of his minerals, 52 with "due regard" for the
surface owner's rights." Although this rule has often provided a
justification for expansion of the mineral owner's rights,54 it is, in
essence, a recognition that the surface owner has some definite and
not have intended that process if they did not mention it. Contra, Department of Forests &
Parks v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co., 250 Md. 125, 242 A.2d 165 (1968).
47. Barker v. Mintz, 73 Colo. 262, 215 P. 534 (1923); New Charter Coal Co. v. McKee,
411 Pa. 307, 191 A.2d 830 (1963).
48. Franklin v. Callicoat, 53 Ohio Op. 240, 119 N.E.2d 688 (1954).
49. United States v. Polino, 131 F. Supp. 772 (N.D. W. Va. 1955). Contra, Department
of Forests & Parks v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co., 250 Md. 125, 242 A.2d 165 (1968).
50. Barker v. Mintz, 73 Colo. 262, 215 P. 534 (1923); Commonwealth v. Fitzmartin, 376
Pa. 390, 102 A.2d 893 (1954).
51. 403 Pa. 383, 388, 170 A.2d 97, 99 (1961).
52. Jilek v. Chicago, W. & F. Coal Co., 382 Ill. 241, 47 N.E.2d 96 (1943); Guffey v.
Stroud, 16 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929); Squires v. Lafferty, 95 W. Va. 307, 121 S.E.
90 (1924); see 3 C. LINDLEY, MNS § 813 (1914).
53. 3 C. LINDLEY, MnES § 814 (1914). He must, for example, use no more of the surface
than necessary to extract the minerals (the amount may vary widely). Stradley v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 155 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941). In some jurisdictions he must
take steps to protect the remainder of the surface owner's property from injury. E.g., Mullins
v. Beatrice Pocahontas Co., 432 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1970), applying Virginia law, held that
mere ownership of minerals did not permit the use of a process which unnecessarily spread
coal dust over the entire surface estate, rendering it useless. See Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Thur-
man, 238 Ark. 789, 384 S.W.2d 482 (1964); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Norvell, 205 Okla.
588, 240 P.2d 80 (1952).
54. The Texas Supreme Court, embracing the so-called "wood and water" doctrine,
recently held that an oil well operator may mine ground water to conduct a water flood
secondary recovery operation, although such use severely diminishes the usefulness of the
surface for irrigated farming. It reached this result in spite of the fact that water was readily
available off the premises. Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972). See also
MacDonnell v. Capital Corp., 130 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1942); Trklja v. Keys, 49 Cal. App. 2d
211, 121 P.2d 54 (1942).
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enduring rights in the surface of the land. The definitions of the
terms "reasonable" and "necessary", however, are far from settled.
"Reasonable" is variously characterized as meaning convenient,"
profitable,56 or in accordance with industry practices.57 Courts have
interpreted it to permit the use of part or all of the surface estate"
or to permit the use of the surface only temporarily." The reasona-
bleness of a particular mining activity may also depend upon the
mineral owner's ability or willingness to reclaim the land after
mining."
The "reasonable and necessary" qualification, like the subja-
cent support rule, developed in response to patently unjust results
from the strict application of the dominance doctrine. Neverthe-
less, it became a part of the law before the introduction of large
scale surface mining for coal, uranium, oil shale, or other materials.
During its formative period, therefore, the courts were concerned
with limiting, rather than preventing, mining. It was rarely neces-
sary to decide whether the entire surface should be destroyed. This
fact, perhaps as much as any other, helps explain the difficulty in
applying the rule to present-day situations.
Even today, however, minerals often can be recovered without
substantially interfering with the rights of the surface owner. Un-
derground mining of coal is accomplished over great distances
without breaking the surface. Directional drilling for oil and gas is
commonplace. The development of new mining technologies also
offers great promise. For example, the use of in situ gasification of
coal" and chemical leaching of uranium could offer viable and ec-
55. "[The mineral owner] cannot claim as an incident that which is simply convenient;
he can only have, as to the surface, that which is necessary, but that which is necessary he
may have in a convenient way." 3 C. LnDLEY, supra note 2, at § 813. But see Buchanan
v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956).
56. Guffey v. Stroud, 16 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929).
57. In Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971), one oil operator's placement
of his pumping units in "basements" to permit the surface owner's use of overhead sprinkler
irrigation made the refusal of a neighboring operator to do so unreasonable. But see Sun Oil
Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972); Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp. v. Meadows,
184 Va. 168, 34 S.E.2d 392 (1945).
58. Stradley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 155 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
59. Lanahan v. Myers, 389 P.2d 92 (Okla. 1963).
60. Smith v. Schuster, 66 So. 2d 430 (La. App. 1953); Olson v. Dillerud, 226 N.W.2d
363 (N.D. 1975). Contra, Arnold H. Bruner & Co. v. McCauley, 319 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1958). Concerning the duty to restore, see Davis, supra note 2, at 349; Lambert, supra
note 2, at 379.
61. With in situ gasification, the controlled "burning" of coal in the ground results in
the generation of product gases which may be drawn off and transported by pipeline for use
like natural gas. Apparently the only disturbance to the surface is the drilling of a series of
holes to ignite the coal and extract the gas. Under some conditions limited subsidence could
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onomic alternatives to surface mining. A few cases suggest that the
mineral owner must use the least destructive alternative process,
even if it is more costly."
The recovery of some materials, of course, requires the destruc-
tion of the surface," either because the materials are themselves
part of the surface of the land,65 or because the only known com-
mercial processes have that effect."6 Some materials may be located
so close to the surface or may be so thick that deep mining would
be impossible or would result in subsidence. 7 In these cases, if it is
not possible to restore the surface to some useful condition after
mining is completed, it may be reasonable to require the mineral
owner to wait for the development of a nondestructive mining pro-
cess, especially when the minerals were purchased long before a
particular destructive process came into wide use.6"
In recent years a clear trend toward abandonment of the dom-
inance doctrine altogether has emerged, at least as applied to min-
ing operations that result in the total destruction of the surface.
According to the Ohio Supreme Court:
Time-honored rules of law, meant to insure the mutual enjoyment of
severed mineral and surface estates, cannot be blindly applied to re-
solve a question involving the right to strip mine. This is true, not be-
cause those rules lack present vitality, but because they are dependent
upon presumptions wholly irrelevant to strip mining."
Leading cases in most of the important coal mining states, except
occur, but it is controllable; pollution of ground water could also be a problem. The process
has been used successfully in the Soviet Union for more than 30 years, and is now being
tested in this country by Texas Utilities, Inc. and others. ARTHuR D. LrrrLE, INc., A CuRRENT
APPRsAIsA OF UNDERGROUND COAL GASIFIcATION (1972).
62. Root, Legal Aspects of Mining by the In-Situ Leaching Method, 22 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 349 (1976). A pilot project in South Texas is described in Koshetz, Niagara
Mohawk Seeks Uranium, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1976, at 35, col. 4. Ground water pollution
could be a serious problem with this process.
63. Gulf Pipe Line Co. v. Pawnee-Tulsa Petroleum Co., 34 Okla. 775, 127 P. 252
(1912); Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971). But see Blue Diamond Coal Co.
v. Neace, 337 S.W.2d 725 (Ky. 1960); Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956).
64. See generally Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 787 (1948).
65. E.g., Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971) (iron ore).
66. For example, the only commercially known method of producing sulphur in the
Gulf Coast region is the Frasch process, which invariably results in subsidence of the sur-
face. Kenney v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 351 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
67. Banks v. Tennessee Mineral Prods. Co., 202 N.C. 408, 163 S.E. 108 (1932)
(feldspar).
68. See, e.g., Binder, A Novel Approach to Reasonable Regulation of Strip Mining, 34
U. Prrr. L. Rxv. 339 (1973); McGinley, Prohibition of Surface Mining in West Virginia, 78
W. VA. L. REv. 445, 472 (1976).
69. Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas Co., 38 Ohio St. 2d 244, 248, 313 N.E.2d 374, 377
(1974). See also Stewart v. Chernicky, 439 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970).
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perhaps Kentucky, have now held flatly that the right to destroy
the surface will not be found in the absence of a clearly expressed
intent to the contrary.70 Thus the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held in Stewart v. Chernicky: " '[T]he burden rests upon him who
seeks to assert the right to destroy or injure the surface' to show
some positive indication that the parties to the deed agreed to au-
thorize practices which may result in these consequences." 7' The
Colorado Supreme Court similarly held that "the rule of construc-
tion of a reservation of the minerals in a deed of conveyance is not
to imply a right to injure or destroy the surface unless the right to
do so is made clear and expressed in terms so plain as to admit no
doubt. 72 The Ohio Supreme Court has declared that "the right to
strip mine is not incident to ownership of a mineral estate."73 Fi-
nally, a few cases seem to have adopted a general presumption
against destructive mining practices. Citing adverse effects on peo-
ple and communities, the loss of productive lands, the destruction
of local tax cases, and the existence of nondestructive alternatives,
these decisions seem to directly refute the prodevelopment views of
the courts in earlier days. 74
Although there is an apparent trend in the decisions in favor of
the surface owner, one cannot confidently formulate any general
rule at this time. Unless the right to use the surface is explicitly
described, neither the surface owner nor the mineral owner may
make any reliable estimate of the value or usefulness of his estate.
In most cases there is simply no way of predicting how much land
70. Smith v. Moore, 172 Colo. 440, 474 P.2d 794 (1970); Barker v. Mintz, 73 Colo. 262,
215 P. 534 (1923); Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas Co., 38 Ohio St. 2d 244, 313 N.E.2d 374
(1974); Franklin v. Callicoat, 53 Ohio Op. 240,119 N.E.2d 688 (1954); Stewart v. Chernicky,
439 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970); Wilkes-Barre Township School Dist. v. Corgan, 403 Pa. 383,
170 A.2d 97 (1961); Campbell v. Campbell, 29 Tenn. App. 651, 199 S.W.2d 931 (1946);
Phipps v. Leftwich, 216 Va. 706, 222 S.E.2d 536 (1976); West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.
Strong, 129 W. Va. 832, 42 S.E.2d 46 (1947). Contra, MacDonnell v. Capital Co., 130 F.2d
311 (9th Cir. 1942). Kentucky has, however, moved far in that direction with the recent case
of Commerce Union Bank v. Kinkade, 540 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1976), wherein it was decided
that strip mining would not be permitted in the absence of language "so extensive as to
subordinate the rights of the surface estate to the demands of the mineral estate." "There
must," the court said, "be a definite enlargement of specified mining rights in the instrument
creating those rights before an owner may conduct mining operations contrary to the rights
usually implied in a mineral grant." Id. at 863-64.
71. 439 Pa. 43, 50, 266 A.2d 259, 263 (1970) (citing Merrill v. Manufacturers Light &
Heat Co., 409 Pa. 68, 185 A.2d 573 (1962)).
72. Smith v. Moore, 172 Colo. 440, 443, 474 P.2d 794, 795 (1970); Evans Fuel Co. v.
Leyda, 77 Colo. 356, 236 P. 1023 (1925); Barker v. Mintz, 73 Colo. 262, 215 P. 534 (1923).
73. Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas Co., 38 Ohio St. 2d 244, 251, 313 N.E.2d 374, 378
(1974).
74. E.g., Franklin v. Callicoat, 53 Ohio Op. 240, 119 N.E.2d 688 (1951); Wilkes-Barre
Township School Dist. v. Corgan, 403 Pa. 383, 170 A.2d 97 (1961).
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the mine operator may occupy, how long he may use it, what the
condition of the land will be after mining, or the effect of available
alternatives. For example, even in a jurisdiction that has held that
the right to strip mine coal must be expressly granted or reserved,
the same rule may not apply to the mining of another substance, or
to the use of another process. Decisions about whether to permit a
particular mining activity often will be made on a case-by-case ba-
sis, depending upon the courts' interpretation of particular deed
language, 75 or upon the facts in a particular case (for example,
whether a particular process was in general use at the time the
minerals were severed from the surface)."
This uncertainty in the law has prevented many landowners
from using their property fully and efficiently because of fear that
their handiwork would be suddenly destroyed by the mineral own-
er. Owners and investors are understandably reluctant to make
substantial improvements to the surface under these conditions.
The planting of an orchard on such land or the construction of a
residential subdivision is simply out of the question." By the same
token, mineral owners may be loathe to make the large capital in-
vestments necessary to develop their properties until their rights
are clarified.78 The present uncertainty also fails to encourage the
preservation of the land as a valuable natural resource in its own
right. The surface owner has little incentive to employ conservation
75. [There is no] form of grant which may be generally said to reflect the norm of
the industry. Realizing the potential fact that no two grants of mining rights may be
identical, it is necessary that a proper construction of such rights be confined to a deed-
to-deed interpretation of clauses in a mineral deed which grant or modify mining rights.
Commerce Union Bank v. Kinkade, 540 S.W.2d 861, 863-64 (Ky. 1976).
76. Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169 (1977). "Furthermore, we are not convinced that a
rule of law which leaves questions of reasonable use of the surface, in each instance where
mineral substances at or near the surface are to be produced, will lead to more certainty and
less litigation." Id. at 171.
77. The court in Quarto Mining Co. v. Litman, 42 Ohio St. 2d 73, 326 N.E.2d 676
(1975), found that an option in the mineral owner to purchase portions of the surface for
deep mining did not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities, even though it was unlimited as
to time, and even though "an effective ceiling price is imposed on the property, above which
no one may, with safety, purchase the property .... Development and improvement of the
property may thereby be severely retarded, for the existence of the option threatens the
developer with loss of the profit from his efforts if the option is exercised." Id. at 77, 326
N.E.2d at 680. The court reasoned that the option merely restates the mineral owner's im-
plied right to use the surface, a right which is vested for purposes of the Rule. But it sug-
gested that an option to strip mine would violate the Rule, because such a right is not nor-
mally an incident of the mineral owner's estate. Accord, West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co.
v. Strong, 129 W. Va. 832, 42 S.E.2d 46 (1947). The distinction between the two cases is a
bit slippery.
78. Polston, Legislation, Existing and Proposed, Concerning Marketability of Mineral
Titles, 7 LAND AND WATER L. REv. 73 (1972).
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practices in the use of his property, especially when substantial
capital investment would be required.
Comprehensive land use planning by government or by private
owners is, under the circumstances, impossible. It is likely, there-
fore, that much of the land will not be put to its highest and best
use. Planning for the orderly development of mineral resources is
also exceedingly difficult. When much of the land is held in divided
ownership, the economic health and security of communities, even
entire regions, may be compromised. Commercial development of
such lands is, as a practical matter, impossible." Opportunities for
new jobs and industrial growth are lost, and needed augmentation
of local tax bases must be foregone.
A recent planning study in one region of Eastern Kentucky
demonstrates these harmful effects:
IFlrom 50 to 75 percent of all the area's land either has . . . separate
ownership or the owners of both are interested primarily in extraction of
subsurface minerals .... A result of this situation has been the reluc-
tance of people to invest in nonmineral production development. . . .,As
matters now stand, the decisions regarding the area's economic and social
future development rest almost totally with the owners of the area's
subsurface rights."
According to the study, the divided ownership of land will affect
even land not directly subject to mining. It is well known that the
widespread destruction of land by surface mining can have a de-
pressing effect upon every aspect of life in an area. 1 Although it is
less well documented it is equally apparent that the mere threat of
such destruction may have a similar effect.
Application of the dominance doctrine has often resulted in
hardship and injustice for individual landowners. 2 The surface
owner frequently finds himself at a disadvantage in bargaining
with the representative of a large mining company or public utility
about the use of the surface. Few have the experience or technical
sophistication to understand what is involved in a modern mining
operation, or to guess at the mineral purchaser's long-range plans.
79. Carpenter, Severed Minerals as a Deterrent to Land Development, 51 DEwER L.J.
1 (1974).
80. Land Use Plan for Kentucky River Area Development District (HUD Project No.
CPA-KY-04-35-1000) 1, 2 (1973).
81. Brooks, Strip Mine Reclamation and Economic Activity, 6 NAT. RFsoURcEs J. 13
(1966); Cardi, Strip Mining and the 1971 West Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation
Act, 75 W. VA. L. REv. 319 (1973); Howard, A Measurement of the External Diseconomies
Associated with Bituminous Coal Surface Mining, Eastern Kentucky 1962-67, 11 NAT. pR-
souRcEs J. 76 (1971); Spore, The Economic Problem of Coal Surface Mining, 2 ENVT'L Asi.
685 (1973).
82. The plight of the people of Eastern Kentucky is described in H. CAUDiLL, NIGHT
COMES TO THE CuMBEuANDs (1963).
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Fewer still have any accurate information about the nature or situ-
ation of the minerals beneath their land.13 Even when there was
an initial meeting of the minds, the doctrine has subsequently
been invoked to permit mining operations that, because of ad-
vances in mining technology or changing economic conditions,
could never have been anticipated by the parties. 4
Last, but not least important, this state of affairs tends to con-
firm a growing sense of mistrust of our legal system in the minds of
many landowners. Because they do not know the law and cannot
afford to litigate their rights, the dominance doctrine has become
symbolic of an unequal and unjust distribution of power and
wealth in this country.5
I1. EXISTING LEGISLATION
It is not surprising that a number of state legislatures and the
Congress have directly addressed various aspects of the conflict be-
tween surface and mineral owners. Moreover, several states have
passed statutes that are concerned principally with other matters,
but that may influence the resolution of this conflict in individual
cases. It is helpful to think of these enactments as falling into sev-
eral categories:
A. Consent statutes: various laws which directly and purposefully de-
fine or modify the legal relationship between surface and mineral
owners;
B. Mining reclamation laws: designed to regulate destructive mining
activities and to require restoration of mined lands to some useful
condition;
C. Protective statutes: intended to prevent mining activities which
would injure particular parcels of land or valuable improvements;
D. Broad land use regulations and zoning ordinances: based on the
doctrine of nuisance and upon a desire to plan for the orderly develop-
ment of land resources; and
E. Other legislative efforts.
Although a number of statutes deal exclusively with mining on
state8" or federally owned" lands, most are not so restricted.
83. Brooks, supra note 81, at 22 n.41.
84. See the discussion in Wilkes-Barre Township School Dist. v. Corgan, 403 Pa. 383,
170 A.2d 97 (1961), involving an attempt to strip mine for coal under an 1893 deed. Compare
the result in Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968). What surface
owner today could anticipate the effects of a process like nuclear mining upon the land?
Howell, Project Gasbuggy-Legal Problems, 14 RocKy MTN. MIN. L. INST. 439, 446-48 (1968).
85. H. CAuDLL, supra note 82.
86. See Fleck, Geraud, Martz & Verity, Oil and Gas Leasing Laws of the Rocky Moun-
tain States, 7 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 353 (1962).
87. Haughey & Gallinger, Legislative Protection of the Surface Owner in the Surface
Mining of Coal Reserved by the United States, 22 RocKy MTN. MIN. L. INST. 145 (1976);
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A. Consent Statutes
Several states have enacted statutes that require, or seem to
require, the consent of the surface owner to conduct surface min-
ing. In all but one instance, this consent is a precondition for issu-
ance of a mining permit under the state's reclamation law. In lieu
of consent, some other states provide for compensation of the sur-
face owner injured by mining. By intervening in the relationship
between surface and mineral owners, each of these statutes either
restates or modifies the common-law dominance doctrine. Although
they vary widely in approach, these statutes seem to have in com-
mon the purpose of promoting fairness and understanding between
the parties.
A number of the statutes simply require a demonstration of
the mineral owner's "right" to use the surface. The West Virginia
statute is typical: "The application for a surface-mining permit
shall contain . . . the source of the operator's legal right to enter
and conduct operations on the land to be covered by the permit.""8
This kind of requirement actually provides no clarification of either
party's rights. When the right to use the surface is not explicitly
stated, the regulatory agency must rely on its own interpretation of
the common-law dominance doctrine to describe the relationship
between the parties. 9
Mall, Federal Mineral Reservations, 10 LAND AND WATER L. REv. 1 (1975); Comment, Protec-
tion for Surface Owners of Federally Reserved Mineral Lands, 2 U.C.L.A.-AiAs. L. REv. 171
(1973).
88. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-6-8 (1978). Similarly, ALA. CODE tit. 9, §§ 16-5(2), 16-36(8)
(1975); COLO. Rav. STAT. § 34-32-112(1)(d) (Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT.ch. 93, § 205(a)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 444.550(1)(2), 444.772(1) (Vernon Supp.
1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-4-222 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 69-25A-10(B)(1) (1978); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1513.07(A)(5), 1514.02(A)(5) (Page Supp. 1979); TEx. NAT. RFs. CODE
ANN. tit. 4, § 131.133(6) (Vernon 1978).
89. The Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 avoided the is-
sue by the following remarkable political compromise:
No permit.. . shall be approved unless...
(6) in cases where the private mineral estate has been severed from the private surface
estate, the applicant has submitted to the regulatory authority-
(A) the written consent of the surface owner to the extraction of coal by sur-
face mining methods; or
(B) a conveyance that expressly grants or reserves the right to extract the coal
by surface mining methods; or
(C) if the conveyance does not expressly grant the right to extract coal by
surface mining methods, the surface-subsurface legal relationship shall be de-
termined in accordance with State law; Provided, That nothing in this chapter
shall be construed to authorize the regulatory authority to adjudicate property
rights disputes.
30 U.S.C.A. § 1260(b) (1979). A provision requiring surface owner consent was one of the
most inflammatory in the strip mining bill passed by the House in 1974, H.R. 11500, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 610(a) (1973). A joint conference committee labored over the House lan-
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States which require the surface owner's consent to reclaim the
land after mining have taken a somewhat different approach. Ac-
cording to the Maryland statute:
[T]he application for a permit shall include, on a form furnished by the
bureau, the written consent of the landowner for the operator or the
state or any of its authorized agents, to enter on any land affected by
the operator within a period of five years after the operation is com-
pleted or abandoned, for the purpose of backfilling, planting, reclama-
tion, and inspection."
Although this is not exactly the same as requiring proof of consent
to surface mine, it may have the same effect, since the surface own-
er's refusal to consent would presumably prevent the issuance of a
permit."
A Tennessee statute is more straightforward. Before surface
mining for coal is commenced, the applicant for a permit must
submit:
Evidence of the operator's legal right to surface mine the minerals on
the land affected by the permit. If the surface estate has been severed
from the mineral estate, such evidence may be provided by either, (a) a
deed, lease, or other document which severs the mineral rights and ex-
pressly permits the removal of minerals by surface mining or a certified
extract of the appropriate provisions of such documents; or (b) a deed,
lease or conveyance which severs the mineral rights without specific
provisions for surface mining and an accompanying affidavit by the cur-
rent surface estate owner agreeing to the removal of such minerals by
surface mining.'2
At least in the case of surface mining for coal, the owner of the
surface estate must have expressly agreed in writing to the destruc-
tion of the surface. A Montana statute is similar:
In those instances in which the surface owner is not the owner of the
mineral estate proposed to be mined by strip-mining operations, the ap-
plication for a permit shall include the written consent or a waiver by
the owner or owners of the surface lands involved to enter and com-
mence strip-mining operations on such land . . ..
guage for more than ten weeks before finally rejecting it. This delay helped make it possible
for President Ford to pocket veto the measure. See Dunlap, An Analysis of the Legislative
History of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1975, 21 RocKY MTN. MiN. L.
INsT. 11 (1975).
90. MD. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 7-505(g), 7-6A-07(d) (1974 and Supp. 1979) (coal and
noncoal mining, respectively). Similarly, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 52-922(a) (Supp. 1979); IND.
CODE ANN. § 13-4-6-5(6) (Burns 1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 444.550(1)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1980);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1396.4(a)(2)(I) (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980); S.D. COMPILED LAws
ANN. § 45-6A-7(8) (Supp. 1979).
91. It is not at all clear under these statutes or the ones following whether the surface
owner's consent would be binding on subsequent bona fide purchasers of the surface interest,
if it were not recorded in the deed records.
92. TENN. CODE ANN. § 58-1544(a)(6)(B) (Supp. 1979).
93. Moor. CODE ANN. § 82-4-224 (1979). A 1974 Kentucky statute provided as follows:
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Presumably the terms "owner" and "current surface estate owner"
will be interpreted broadly enough to allow the consent of any sur-
face owner during his tenure of ownership. Otherwise, a surface
owner could force the mineral owner to pay twice for the right to
strip mine the same land. 4
Another Montana act provides that: "All prospectors for min-
erals, miners, or other persons contemplating surface disturbance
by mechanical equipment other than hand tools . . . must first ob-
tain from the surface owner of private land specific written ap-
proval of the proposed work or operations." 5 In Wyoming the ap-
plicant for a coal mining permit must submit "an instrument of
consent from the surface landowner, if different from the owner of
the mineral estate, to the mining plan and reclamation plan.""
These two statutes also may be broader than necessary. The sur-
Each application shall also be accompanied by a statement of consent to have strip
mining conducted upon the area of land described in the application for a permit. The
statement of consent shall be signed by each holder of a freehold interest in such land.
Each signature shall be notarized. No permit shall be issued if the application therefor
is not accompanied by the statement of consent.
Ky. REv. STAT. § 350-060(8) (Supp. 1978). That statute enjoyed a very short career, however,
before being struck down in the case of Department of Natural Resources v. No. 8 Limited,
528 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1975); see note 197 infra. A surface owner protection provision of the
new federal surface mining law prohibits leasing of federally owned coal until the surface
owner (as that term is narrowly defined) has given "written consent to enter and commence
surface mining operations." 30 U.S.C.A. § 1304(c) (1979). See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18-
06 (Supp. 1979) (where a mineral lease between surface owner and mineral developer may be
substituted for the required statement of consent).
94. For a possible constitutional objection to such a construction, see text accompany-
ing note 199, infra.
95. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 82-2-302, 303(2) (1979). Both Montana statutes are discussed
in Roberts & Stone, Recent Developments in Montana Natural Resources Law, 38 MoNT. L.
REv. 169 (1977); Comment, Montana's Statutory Protection of Surface Owners from Strip
Mining and Resultant Problems of Mineral Deed Construction, 37 MoN. L. REv. 347 (1976).
96. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-406(b)(xii) (Supp. 1979). However, the statute also pro-
vides that:
If consent cannot be obtained as to the mining plan or reclamation plan or both, the
applicant may request a hearing before the environmental quality council. The council
shall issue an order in lieu of consent if it finds:
(A) That the mining plan and the reclamation plan have been submitted to the
surface owner for approval;
(B) That the mining plan and the reclamation plan is detailed so as to illustrate the
full proposed surface use including proposed routes of egress and ingress;
(C) That the use does not substantially prohibit the operations of the surface owner;
(D) The proposed plan reclaims the surface to its approved future use, in segments
if circumstances permit, as soon as feasibly possible ....
Id. We are not told what sort of mining activity will so "substantially prohibit" the surface
owner's operations that a permit application will be denied (although it is difficult to imag-
ine any strip mining process which would not come within the usual meaning of those
words). If the surface belongs to a resident or agricultural landowner (as those terms are
narrowly defined), consent must be obtained in every case. Id.. at § 35-11-406(b)(xi).
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face owner should have no interest in the details of the mining op-
eration, except as it affects the physical extent and duration of sur-
face interference and the condition of the land after mining is
completed. 7 Both statutes require, in effect, that the operator com-
plete his planning before purchasing the mineral interest. Other-
wise he will have to negotiate with the surface owner twice. By con-
trast, a Kansas statute is concerned only with the condition of the
land after mining is completed. It requires oil and gas well opera-
tors "to leave the land, as nearly as practicable, in the same condi-
tion [as it was originally] . . . unless the owner of said land and
the abandoning party have entered into a contract providing
otherwise.","
As early as 1874 Colorado enacted legislation requiring pay-
ment of money damages as compensation to surface owners whose
land was injured by mining:
When the right to mine is in any case separate from the ownership or
right of occupancy to the surface, the owner or rightful occupant of the
surface may demand satisfactory security from the miner, and if it is
refused, he may enjoin such miner from working until such security is
given."
A number of states and the federal government have followed the
Colorado example by requiring mine operators to post a bond or
provide security for damages if the consent of the surface owner
cannot be obtained.1es In Wyoming the mineral owner must furnish
a bond in all cases unless it is expressly waived by the surface own-
er."0' These provisions, however, may satisfy neither party. On the
one hand, they may impose a cost upon the mineral owner that was
not bargained for. On the other hand, the payment of money dam-
ages may not fairly compensate the surface owner who has reason-
able, but conflicting, expectations concerning the use of his
97. The Montana statute provides for notice to be given to the surface owner "which
will sufficiently disclose the plan of work and operations, including contemplated measures
for the protection and restoration of the land and waters, to enable [the surface owner] to
evaluate the extent of disturbance contemplated and the effectiveness and sufficiency of the
protection and restoration measures planned." MoNr. CODE ANN. § 82-2-303 (1979).
96. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-132a (1976).
99. Laws of 1874, p. 1888, § 12 (currently codified as COLO. REv. STAT. § 34-48-106
(1973)).
100. 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1976) (part of the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916); N.D.
CENr. CODE § 38-18-06(5) (Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 69-9-1 to -10 (1978); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 52 § 1406.15 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980). Prescribed lease forms for state lands may
require security for surface damages. The Idaho practice is described in Fleck, Geraud,
Martz & Verity, Oil and Gas Leasing Laws of the Rocky Mountain States, 7 RocKY MTN.
MiN. L. INsT. 353, 378-79 (1962).
101. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-416 (Supp. 1979).
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property.10 2
The effect of these statutes is to confer upon the mineral owner
a private right of eminent domain,1 3 even though mining by pri-
vate parties has not generally been considered a public use.' 4 If the
parties cannot agree upon the amount of compensation, a regula-
tory authority'0 ' or a court'6 may determine the amount. Unfortu-
nately, none of these statutes definitively states how the interest
taken should be valued. 0 In most cases it is not clear, for example,
whether the mineral owner must pay for lost profits or imputed
rents, for interference with a highly specialized use by the surface
owner, or for destruction of improvements made after the surface
and minerals were separated. 0 The willingness or ability of the
102. In Barker v. Mintz, 73 Colo. 262, 215 P. 534 (1923), the mineral owner complained
that the Colorado statute created new rights for the surface owner. The surface owner coun-
tered that, far from expanding his rights, the statute deprived him of his remedy in the case
of imminent danger or irreparable injury.
103. 1 C. LINDLEY, MINES § 252-264 (1914); Comment, Subsidence Regulation, 6 LAND
AND WATER L. Rav. 543, 546 (1971).
104. 2A NICHOLS' LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.624 (rev. 3d ed. 1979); Ferguson, Sev-
ered Surface and Mineral Estates-Right to Use, Damage or Destroy the Surface to Recover
Minerals, 19 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 411, 430-33 (1974). But see Highland Boy Gold Min-
ing Co. v. Strickley, 28 Utah 215, 78 P. 296, afrd, 200 U.S. 527 (1904). The Idaho Constitu-
tion declares the use of lands for mining and related activities to be a public use, IDAHO
CONST. art. 1, § 14. See also OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 23 ("No private property shall be taken
or damaged for private use, with or without compensation, unless by consent of the owner,
except for private ways of necessity, or for drains and ditches across lands of others for...
mining . . . purposes, in such manner as may be prescribed by law,") applied in Lyons v.
McKay, 313 P.2d 527, 529 (Okla. 1957). A New Mexico law provides for unitization of small
tracts (two acres or less) by owners of larger mineral interests for uranium mining, but it
does not describe the mineral owner's right to use the surface. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 69-9
(1978).
105. E.g., Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-416(a) (1977).
106. E.g., 30 U.S.C. § 1305 (1979).
107. If the proper measure is the market value of the surface, should that value be
diminished because of the mineral owner's right to destroy it? To the extent that compensa-
tion is based on the value of the surface, the result may be a foregone conclusion. A payment
of $500 per acre for grazing land may be an almost inconsequential part of the cost of recov-
ering, say, 7000 tons per acre of coal worth $15 per ton.
108. The Wyoming Statute provides the most guidance. The mineral owner must fur-
nish a bond
in an amount sufficient to secure the payment for any damages to the surface estate, to
the crops and forage, or to the tangible improvements of the surface owner. This
amount shall be determined by the administrator and shall be commensurate with the
reasonable value of the surrounding land, and the effect of the overall operation of the
landowner. This bond is in addition to the performance bond required for reclamation
by this act. As damage is determined it shall be paid. Financial loss resulting from
disruption of the surface owner's operation shall be considered as part of the damage.
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-416(a) (1977). Under the federal Surface Mining Control and Rec-
lamation Act of 1977, the lessee of federal lands overlying federally owned coal must be
compensated for damages to crops or to tangible improvements. For this purpose the mine
operator must furnish a bond prior to the commencement of mining. 30 U.S.C.A. § 1305
(1979).
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mineral owner to restore the land after mining apparently is given
no consideration. The compensation statutes may temper the un-
fairness arising from a strict application of the dominance doctrine,
but it is unlikely that they will satisfy the reasonable, if unstated,
expectations of either party.
B. Reclamation Laws
Most states with extensive surface mining have now adopted
some regulations for those activities. Although these laws are pri-
marily designed to protect the public interest in preservation of
land as a vital, permanent, natural resource, they may also afford
some protection to surface owners by limiting the destructiveness
of the mining process. They may even give the surface owner some
opportunity to protect himself. For example, statutes usually re-
quire that notice of a permit application be given to a surface own-
er, who is then entitled to intervene in the permit granting pro-
cess."0' The surface owner may be able to force strict compliance
with the regulations or to influence the agency's decisions about
monitoring and reclamation requirements, the amount of a per-
formance bond, the withdrawal of certain lands from mining, or the
selection of a postmining land use. He may also directly challenge
the mineral owner's legal right to use a destructive mining process.
If a permit is granted he may monitor the mine operator's perform-
ance to ensure strict conformity with permit conditions.110 The re-
sults of the surface owner's efforts in a given case are, of course,
quite unpredictable. Furthermore, they may bear no resemblance
to what the parties originally intended.
C. Protective Statutes
Several states and the federal government have incorporated
selective controls into their mining reclamation laws, providing for
the "withdrawal" of specified lands from surface mining."' The
109. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 82-2-301 to -306 (1979); Tax. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. tit.
4, §§ 131.047, 131.159-.163, 165 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
110. MoNr. CODE ANN. § 82-4-252 (1979) provides for citizen suits to compel compli-
ance. See also Surface Mining Control and Reclamaton Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.A. § 1270
(1979).
111. 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1272, 1281 (1979); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 52-960 (Supp. 1979); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 34-32-115(4) (Supp. 1978); Ky. REV. STAT. § 350.065 (Supp. 1978); MD. NAT.
RES. CODE ANN. § 7-505.1 (Supp. 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-4-227 (1979); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 69-25A-26 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-14.1-05, -07 (Supp. 1979); OHfo REv. CODE
ANN. § 1513.02(B) (Page Supp. 1979); S.D. CompiLED LAws ANN. § 45-6A-9.1 (Supp. 1979);
TEx. NAT. Has. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 131.035 (Vernon 1978); VA. CODE § 45.1-252 (Supp. 1979);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-6-11 (1978); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-425 (Supp. 1979). See also,
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Wyoming law, for example, provides that the regulatory agency
shall deny a permit to surface mine if "[tihe proposed mining oper-
ation would irreparably harm, destroy, or materially impair any
area that has been designated . . . [as] having particular histori-
cal, archaeological, wildlife, surface geological, botanical or scenic
value."12 Other statutes provide protection for unusually produc-
tive lands'" 3 or lands that cannot be restored after mining.,
Another type of protective statute is designed to prevent injury
to surface improvements."' A provision of the Tennessee law is
typical:
If the commissioner finds that any part of the operation would consti-
tute a hazard to a dwelling house, public building, school, church, cem-
etery, commercial or institutional building, public road, stream, lake,
reservoir, water wells, officially designated scenic areas or other private
or public property, the commissioner shall delete such part of the land
from the area for which the permit is granted.16
Others place less discretion in the regulatory agency. For ex-
ample, in Wyoming a permit will not be granted if "[t]he affected
land lies within three hundred (300) feet of any existing occupied
dwelling, home, public building, school, church, community or in-
stitutional building, park or cemetery, unless the landowner's con-
sent has been obtained.""' 7 Consent by the owner of the improve-
ments will presumably permit mining in all jurisdictions.
The Supreme Court struck down a similar Pennsylvania stat-
ute"' in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon."' It prohibited mining
that might cause damage from subsidence to, for example, a dwell-
McGinley, Prohibition of Surface Mining in West Virginia, 78 W. VA. L. REv. 445 (1976).
The withdrawal provision of the Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1272 (1979), was ruled unconstitutional as a taking of private property
without due process in Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Assoc. v. Andrus, No. 78-
0244B (W.D. Va. Jan. 3, 1980).
112. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-406 (h)(iv) (Supp. 1979).
113. E.g, Momr. CODE ANN. §§ 82-4-227(2)(a) and (5) (1979).
114. E.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-6-11 (1978).
115. AiA. CODE tit. 9, § 16-46 (1975); COLO. REv. STAT. § 34-32-1154(d) (Supp. 1978);
Ky. REv. STAT. § 350.085 (3) (Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 444.610.1 (5) (Vernon Supp.
1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-4-227(7) (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 69-25A-26(3), (4) (1978);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-14.1-07(5) (Supp. 1979); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1513.02(B) (Page
Supp. 1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 1396.4b(c), 1406.4 (Supp. 1978); S.D. COMPILED LAWs
ANN. § 45-6A-9.1(2) (Supp. 1979-1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 58-1544(g) (Supp. 1979); TEx.
NAT. REs. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 131.038(6) (Vernon 1978); VA. CODE § 45.1-252(D)(4)(Supp.
1979); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-6-11 (1978); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-406(h)(viii) (Supp.
1979).
116. TENN. CODE ANN. § 58-1544(g) (Supp. 1979).
117. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-406(h)(viii) (Supp. 1979).
118. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 661 to 671 (Purdon 1966), commonly known as the
Kohler Act.
119. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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ing house. The fact that none of the present state statutes has suf-
fered the same fate as the Pennsylvania act 20 suggests a movement
toward the position expressed by Justice Brandeis in his dissent in
that case, namely, that the nuisance character of the destructive
mining process warrants the intervention of the state, in the public
interest, to protect a threatened private interest.
2
'
These statutes are plainly designed to protect important pub-
lic values, yet they also reflect the view that the construction of
valuable improvements is inconsistent with an implied grant to an-
other of the right to destroy those improvements. However, like the
consent and reclamation statutes mentioned earlier and the land
use regulations which follow, none of the protective statutes covers
all kinds of destructive mining practices or all minerals. They also
fail to offer protection to valuable improvements not specifically
described in the statutes.
D. Land Use Regulations
Local zoning ordinances have been used for a number of years
to restrict mining. 2 2 Because zoning takes place at the lowest levels
of government, the individual landowner may have a greater oppor-
tunity to influence decision making than he would at the state or
federal level. The effect of local zoning cannot extend beyond the
political boundaries of the enacting government, however, and zon-
ing may be less stable than other kinds of laws.12s A few states have
now adopted comprehensive state-wide land use laws that require
permits for any activities that could have a major environmental
120. Fifteen years after Mahon, the Pennsylvania legislature passed an almost identi-
cal law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 1407 to 1410d (Purdon 1966), which was tested, but not
conclusively, in Klein v. Republic Steel Corp., 435 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1970). In the case of
William E. Russell Coal Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 270 P.2d 772 (Colo. 1954), the
mineral owner was given a condemnation award for coal lying adjacent to and beneath a
public highway, the court relying on Mahon.
121. "The restriction here in queston is merely the prohibition of a noxious use ....
The State merely prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount
rights of the public." 260 U.S. at 417. See the discussion in Sax, Takings and the Police
Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 48-50 (1964). Applicaton of the principle seems to go beyond mere
locational preferences of the type expressed in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365, 388 (1926) ("pig in the parlor"). For a discussion of the taking question, see text
accompanying notes 210-29 infra.
122. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Consolidated Rock Products Co. v.
City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962); Crawford, Zoning
Law and Extractive Industry-The Michigan Experience, 51 N.D. L. Rev. 341 (1974); Note
Local Zoning of Strip Mining, 57 Ky. L.J. 738 (1969).
123. A state mining reclamaton law may require the licensing agency to take into ac-
count local zoning or land use plans. E.g., Omo Rxv. CODE ANN. § 1514.02(A)(9)(b)(Page
1978).
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impact ' or that provide for designation of certain areas as closed
to destructive mining processes.-' While zoning and land use laws
may afford some protection to individual owners, they are neither
uniform nor predictable in their application, and they cannot re-
flect the correlative rights of surface and mineral owners. '
E. Other Legislative Efforts
Several states have enacted "marketability" statutes, provid-
ing that after some specified period of nonuse a severed mineral
interest will be rejoined with the surface interest.12 7 These acts are
intended to promote the orderly and progressive development of
both surface and mineral resources by removing the threat of de-
struction of the surface after a reasonable time has elapsed, and by
freeing the minerals for exploitation by someone else. 1 2
A recent Tennessee statute adopted the presumption, recog-
nized in many judicial decisions, that the parties to a mineral deed
or lease intended to permit only those mining processes in general
use when the conveyance was made:
In any instrument heretofore or hereafter executed purporting to sever
the surface and mineral estates which does not describe the manner or
method of mineral extraction in express and specific terms, it shall be
presumed that the intention of the parties to the instrument was that
the minerals be extracted only in the principal manner and method of
mineral extraction prevailing in Tennessee at the time the instrument
was executed. This section is not intended to exclude evidence that
would otherwise be admissible to show the intentions of the parties. The
provisions of this section shall only apply to mineral estates in coal.12t
The relationship between this statute and the Tennessee consent
statute13 0 is not clear; presumably strip mining for coal could never
124. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 38, §§ 481-489 (1978 & Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
10 §§ 6001-6089 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
125. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 380.012 to .12 (1974 & Supp. 1979) (defining "areas of
critical concern") (declared unconstitutional in part in Cross Key Waterways v. Askew, 371
S.2d 913 (Fla. 1979)); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 681-689 (1974 & Supp. 1979); W. VA.
CODE §§ 20-6A-1, -2 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
126. For other weaknesses in this approach, see Bosselman, The Control of Surface
Mining: An Exercise in Creative Federalism, 9 NAT. RxsoURcEs J. 137, 154-60 (1969); Car-
penter, Severed Minerals as a Deterrent to Land Development, 51 DENVER L.J. 1, 16-20
(1974).
127. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, §§ 197-198 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); LA. CIV. CoDE
ANN. art. 753, 3546 (West 1953 & Supp. 1979); VA. CoDE ANN. § 55-154 (Supp. 1979).
128. Polston, Legislation, Existing and Proposed, Concerning Marketability of Mineral
Titles, 7 LAND & WATER L. REv. 73 (1972); Note, Severed Mineral Interests, A Problem
Without A Solution?, 46 N.D. L. REV. 451 (1970).
129. TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-511 (Supp. 1979).
130. TENN. CODE ANN. § 58-1544(a)(6)(B) (Supp. 1979). See text accompanying note 92
supra.
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be conducted without the express consent of the surface owner, so
the presumption raised by the statute would be irrelevant in the
case of strip mining (though it could apply, for example, to in situ
gasification). Furthermore, it may be difficult for a court to estab-
lish the exact date on which a particular mining technique became
prevalent in Tennessee. Until these questions are answered, the
rights of surface and mineral owners will remain in doubt.
North Dakota has enacted a statute requiring the express
description of the mineral conveyed:
No conveyance of mineral rights or royalties separate from the surface
rights in real property in this state, excluding leases, shall be construed
to grant or convey to the grantee thereof any interest in and to any
gravel, coal, clay or uranium unless the intent to convey such interest is
specifically and separately set forth in the instrument of the
conveyance.
No lease of mineral rights in this state shall be construed as passing any
interest to any minerals except those minerals specifically included and
set forth by name in the lease . . . . The use of the words "all other
minerals" or similar words of an all-inclusive nature in any lease shall
not be construed as leasing any minerals except those minerals specifi-
cally named in the lease and their compounds and byproducts.111
Other states have adopted legislative definitions of various mineral
substances. 32 Although these statutes are apparently preoccupied
with the question of ownership, they may also effect a restriction of
destructive mining processes. These statutes seem to make it im-
possible to transfer all of the minerals beneath a tract of land with-
out enumeration of the substances included. On some occasions,
however, the precise intent of the parties may be to sever the sur-
face from anything and everything beneath it. So long as the par-
131. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-24 (1978). The predictable result of this requirement has
been the modificaton of standard lease forms in North Dakota to cover "oil, gas, sulphur,
coal, peat, lignite, uranium and without restriction to such enumerated minerals, all other
minerals whether similar or dissimilar to those particularly specified herein." 1 H. WIMIAS
& C. MEYmS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 219, at 254 n.3 (1978). It is not entirely clear whether
"conveyance" includes a lease, or whether reservations are to be treated the same as convey-
ances. Another North Dakota statute provided that in order to be effective a "reservation" of
an interest in coal must contain an accurate description of the nature, length, width, and
thickness of the deposit. 1911 N.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 304 (repealed by 1979 N.D. Seass. Laws,
ch. 187, § 108). It was struck down in the case of Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543
(N.D. 1973), on the grounds that it created a classification based upon method of acquisi-
tion, in violation of the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth amendment. See Fleck,
Severed Mineral Interests, 51 N.D. L. Rav. 369 (1974); Hagen, North Dakota's Surface
Mining and Reclamation Law-Will Our Wealth Make Us Poor?, 50 N.D. L. Rzv. 437
(1974).
132. For example, the Arizona statute provides that "'Oil and gas' and 'oil or gas'
includes oil, gas, other hydrocarbon substances, and helium or other substances of a gaseous
nature." ARmz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 27-551(5) (1976). Similar enactments in other states are
discussed in Fleck, Geraud, Martz & Verity, Oil and Gas Leasing Laws of the Rocky Moun-
tain States, 7 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 353 (1962).
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ties clearly understand what is conveyed or reserved and what the
effect of the removal of the minerals will be on the surface, there is
no reason not to uphold the transaction.
A Pennsylvania statute provides that if there has been a prior
severance of coal or of the right of surface support, recorded or un-
recorded, or if there is a contemporaneous severance, any instru-
ment conveying an interest in the surface estate must contain a
recitation that:
This document (may not) (does not) sell, convey, transfer, include or
insure the title to the coal and right of support underneath the surface
land described or referred to herein, and the owner or owners of such
coal may have the complete legal right to remove all of such coal and,
in that connection, damage may result to the surface of the land and
any house, building or other structure on or in such land.n
A seller who fails to include the prescribed language is liable to the
purchaser for any resulting damages.'34 A companion provision pro-
vides similar protection for some improvements. 3' Of course, the
seller's assurance will not in any way affect the mineral owner's
right to use or destroy the surface, and recourse against the seller
may not adequately compensate an aggrieved purchaser. The pri-
mary value of the required notice, to the extent it is given, will be
to provide a warning that the right of support may be in doubt.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR NEW LEGISLATION
A. The Model Act
It is now evident that the strict application of the dominance
doctrine is not warranted, either in terms of the parties' expecta-
tions or because of any compelling public policy. Judicial attempts
to modify the doctrine have resulted in widespread confusion and
hardship, and legislative efforts to clarify the relationship between
133. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1551(a)(l)-(2) (Purdon 1966).
134. Id. § 1552.
135. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 1406.14 -.16 (Purdon Supp. 1979). This statute seems
to leave the vitality of the Pennsylvania rule of subjacent support somewhat in doubt. It
describes a procedure for the surface owner to "acquire" protection from subsidence, provid-
ing further: "Any owner of surface land without the right of surface support who shall not
take advantage of the provisions of this section shall have no recourse under law for any
damage caused by subsidence resulting from coal mining operations." Id., § 1406.15(c). If
the surface owner still enjoys an absolute right of subjacent support, the statute would have
no applicability unless the right of support is expressly negatived. But does the statute con-
template that such a clear expression of understanding between the parties be disregarded?
If so, the surface owner is effectively given a private right of eminent domain; this scheme
seems to be modeled on the English Mines Act of 1923, 13 & 14 Geo. 5 c. 20, § 8. A variation
of this approach is suggested in Carpenter, Severed Minerals as a Deterrent to Land Devel-
opment, 51 DENvSR L.J. 1, 28-29 (1974).
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surface and mineral owners have been neither comprehensive nor
entirely evenhanded in application. The purpose of the Model Sur-
face Rights Clarification Act, set out below, is to quantify and clar-
ify the operation of the "dominant mineral owner" doctrine. By
precisely describing the conditions under which a severed mineral
owner may conduct operations that substantially impair the use
and enjoyment of the surface, the Act provides clear guidance
where the dominance doctrine is only suggestive. The Model Act is
significantly different from any existing legislation, both in breadth
of coverage and in its tactical approach. Prior legislative efforts to
resolve the problems mentioned here have been largely piecemeal,
focusing on selected minerals or mining procedures or on narrow
aspects of the parties' relationship. For the most part, they re-
present topical political responses to the most abusive practices of
the mining industries. By concentrating instead on the condition of
the land after mining is completed, the Model Act is able to deal
comprehensively with all mining activities and all mineral sub-
stances. Questions of ownership may thus be resolved separately.
Because the emphasis is on the result, rather than on the mining
process, the original expectations of both parties are more likely to
be met.
Unlike the compensation statutes or the broader reclamation
laws, the rights described by the Act are prophylactic in nature,
rather than remedial. Those rights are set forth with relative preci-
sion and are not dependent on future events or circumstances that
cannot be ascertained by reference to the public records. In this
way fair and open dealing between the parties is encouraged and
the public's broader interest in the security and stability of titles to
land will be protected.
MODEL SURFACE RIGHTS CLARIFICATION ACT
I. TITLE
This Act shall be known and may be cited as the "Surface
Rights Clarification Act."
II. FINDINGS
The Legislature finds that-
A. The full and beneficial use of the lands of this State,
and the security of ownership of such lands and improve-
ments thereto, are in the interest of all the people of this
State;
B. The economic well-being of the State is dependent
upon the conservation and efficient utilization of all of the
natural resources of the State, including the land;
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C. Many landowners in this State do not own part or all
of the mineral estates beneath their lands, and the number
of instances where surface and mineral rights are held by
different persons is increasing;
D. In many instances it is not possible for the owner of a
mineral estate to secure the possession and enjoyment of
the minerals without using and occupying the surface es-
tate or some portion thereof, or without causing some in-
jury to such surface estate, thus interfering with the lawful
activities of the owner of the surface estate;
E. In some instances activities of the owner of the surface
estate may interfere with the owner of the mineral estate in
his lawful efforts to possess and enjoy the minerals;
F. The failure of surface and mineral owners to explicitly
agree upon the mineral owners' rights to use and occupy or
injure the surface estate and to be free from interference
by the owner of the surface estate, has resulted in wide-
spread confusion, conflict and uncertainty in the law con-
cerning such rights;
G. Because of this uncertainty either surface or mineral
owners, or both, may be deprived without their consent of
the full use and enjoyment of their respective estates;
H. This uncertainty in the law has resulted in individual
hardship and injustice, has restricted the alienability of
the land, has promoted litigation, has discouraged the full,
efficient and orderly use and improvement of the land, has
impeded the growth of agriculture and the development of
new industry and has generally depressed the economy of
the State;
I. The continuation of such uncertainty represents a real
and present threat to the health, safety and general wel-
fare of the people of this State.
III. PURPOSES
The purposes of this Act are-
A. To facilitate and require the demonstration of a clear
understanding between the owners of surface and mineral
estates in land concerning their respective rights to use
and occupy or injure the surface of the land;
B. To protect the security of titles to land and improve-
ments thereto;
C. To promote the free alienability of land;
D. To prevent hardship and injustice to surface or min-
eral owners arising from uncertainty in the law;
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E. To promote the conservation and the full and efficient
use of all of the natural resources of the State, including
the land, the making of improvements to the land, the
growth of agriculture, the development of new industry
and the general well-being of the State and its people.
IV. CONSENT
A. No person who is not the owner of the land or the sur-
face of the land in fee shall conduct any mining operation
upon or beneath such land, if there is a reasonable likeli-
hood that the effect of such operation would be to substan-
tially interfere, now or at any time in the future, with a
surface owner's present or future use of the land, unless
such person shall first have obtained the express written
consent of the surface owner.
B. For the purpose of this Act, a mining operation shall
be deemed to substantially interfere with the surface own-
er's use only if-
1. Such operation affects or occupies an area of land
larger than ten acres out of any larger contiguous
tract of land belonging to the same surface owner; or
2. Such operation affects or occupies more than one-
fourth of the area of any contiguous tract of land be-
longing to the same surface owner; or
3. As a result of such operation the land affected
could not be put to the same use that it had before
mining was commenced; or
4. The surface owner is deprived of the use of any
part of his land for longer than ten years; or
5. Such operation results in the injury or destruction
of any residence dwelling, public or commercial build-
ing, school, church, cemetery, railroad, public road-
way, or other substantial improvement to the surface
of the land.
C. The burden shall be upon the person asserting a right
to conduct mining operations to show that no substantial
interference with the surface owner's use would be reason-
ably likely to result from the proposed mining operation.
D. The term "person," as used herein, shall mean any
corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship or other busi-
ness association, agent, government agency, trust, estate,
foundation, voluntary organization, or natural person or
persons.
E. The term "surface owner" shall mean all persons from
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time to time owning any vested or possessory interest, le-
gal or equitable, including a leasehold interest or security
interest, in the surface of the land.
F. The term "mining operation" shall mean any activity
which is in any way related to the removal of any sub-
stance that forms part of the surface or that lies be-
neath the surface of the earth, or to the exploration for
such substances.
V. FORM AND CONTENT OF CONSENT
A. The required consent shall be in writing and shall be
sworn to and signed by the current surface owner or by any
previous surface owner at the time he was the surface own-
er. Such consent may be incorporated into and be made a
part of an instrument conveying or reserving an interest in
the land or the mineral estate described; but if the surface
owner is the grantee in such an instrument, only the signa-
ture of the mineral owner need appear on the instrument.
Such consent shall be notarized and shall in all other re-
spects be in a form and meet the requirements for docu-
ments to be recorded in the deed records.
B. The consent shall--
1. Describe fully the land to be affected by the
mining operation;
2. Specify the approximate beginning date and
length of time during which the surface owner will be
prevented by such mining operation from using and
occupying the land affected;
3. Describe the physical condition after mining is
completed, and after any reclamation which is re-
quired or promised to be carried out, of each area of
land affected by such mining operation.
C. The mere waiver by the surface owner of damages for
injury to the surface estate will not satisfy the require-
ments for description specified in this paragraph.
VI. NOTICE TO THIRD PARTIES: RECORDATION
The required consent shall not be deemed to constitute notice
to or be binding upon persons without actual notice, unless it is
recorded in the deed records of the county or counties in which
the affected land is situated.
VII. PROSPECTIVE AND RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT
The consent specified in this Act shall be required whether the
instrument under which any person asserts a right to mine is
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dated earlier or later in time than the effective date of this Act.
It shall be required for the expansion of existing operations to
previously unaffected lands.
VIII. PRESERVATION OF EXISTING RIGHTS
Nothing herein shall be deemed to permit the use, occupation
or injury to the surface of the land by mining operations where
such use, occupation or injury would not be permitted without
reference to this Act.
IX. SEVERABILITY
If any word or provision of this Act or the application thereof to
any person or circumstance is found to be invalid, the invalid-
ity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the Act
which can be given effect without the invalid provision or appli-
cation, and to this end the provisions of this Act are severable.
B. Commentary on the Model Act
Findings and Purposes. While in many jurisdictions it is
not customary to describe the legislative purpose in such a long
preamble,'38 such an explanation may furnish the only tangible
evidence of the lawmakers' intent, outside of the operative pro-
visions of the statute itself.37 Although that evidence may not
be binding upon a court construing or interpreting the statute,
it nonetheless raises a strong presumption that the purpose
stated was the controlling, ' if not the exclusive one. 3 '
136. The language of the purpose clause in the Tennessee Surface Owner Protection
Act of 1977 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 164, § 1, is almost identical, having been adapted from an
earlier proposal by the author. J. Dycus, Mining Law: A Statutory Proposal for Clarification
of Rights to Use or Destroy the Surface of the Land (1976) (unpublished) (copy on file with
the Vanderbilt Law Review).
137. Unlike the federal practice, in most states neither committee hearings nor floor
debates are recorded. For an argument that the purpose of a well-drafted statute should be
obvious from its terms, see R. DICKERSON, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING 107 (1954).
138. Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U.S. 1 (1904). Such evidence of legislative
purpose might have made it more difficult for the Kentucky Court of Appeals to strike down
that state's consent statute in Department for Nat. Resources & Environmental Protection
v. No. 8 Ltd., 528 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1975); see note 190 infra.
139. The purpose clause of the North Dakota Surface Owner Protection Act provides:
[I]t is necessary to exercise the police power of the state as described in this chap-
ter to protect the public welfare of North Dakota which is largely dependent on agricul-
ture, and to protect the economic well-being of individuals engaged in agricultural pro-
duction. This finding recognizes that the people of North Dakota desire to retain a
strong agricultural economy ....
N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18-02(1) (Supp. 1979). Professor Beck suggests that one important
purpose of the consent laws is to protect the agricultural enterprise. Beck, Surface Owner
Consent Laws: The Agricultural Enterprise Versus Surface Mining for Coal, 1977 S. ILL.
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The Requirement of Consent. The central theme of the
Model Act is that, except under certain clearly defined circum-
stances, the parties to a deed or lease that severs an interest in
minerals from the surface estate should have a clearly ex-
pressed understanding about the rights of the mineral owner to
use or injure the surface. 4 ' The parties should demonstrate their
understanding and make it known to third parties by putting it
in writing and making it a part of the public record. When there
is no written understanding, the statute precisely limits and
describes the surface and mineral owners' rights.
The Model Act applies to all mining processes that are
likely to substantially interfere with the surface owner's use of
the land."' The ownership of a particular mineral deposit prop-
erly becomes an issue to be decided separately. The recovery of
all minerals is covered, whether surface or subterranean, migra-
tory or stationary, liquid or solid, organic or inorganic. Coal,
uranium, phosphates, talc, limestone, sand, gravel, graphite,
boartes, vermiculite, shale, granite, sulphur, salt, oil, and even
water would be included. The term "substance" is used to indi-
cate the widest possible variety of materials that might be re-
covered from the earth.142
Similarly, the statute applies to any activity related to
mining that has an effect on the surface. In addition to the ac-
tual penetration of the surface of the earth, the definition en-
compasses the construction of roads and other facilities, the
storage of spoil, the use of water or other materials from the
surface or the destruction of surface improvements. The explo-
ration for minerals is also included. Thus, the statute is broad
enough to cover any activity of the mineral owner which has the
effect of interfering with the normal activities of the surface
owner or impairing the usefulness of the surface estate.143
It is not necessary that the mining operation be the imme-
diate and direct cause of the destruction.144 Thus, deep mining
for coal would be covered if it were conducted in a way that
could cause subsidence of the surface or pollution of ground
water supplies at some time in the future. It is not necessary
U.L.J. 303. They certainly will have that effect to some degree, by increasing the cost of
production for mineral owners who lack such consent, thus discouraging mining.
140. Model Act, § IV. A..
141. Id. § IV. F..
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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that the destruction be certain to occur. The reasonable likeli-
hood of destruction will bring the mining operation within sec-
tion IV. A of the Act. There is now enough experience with
most mining processes to be able to predict their effect. When
such experience is lacking, for example with in situ gasification
of coal, it seems only fair to require the mineral owner to bear
any risk associated with his venture, by requiring him to bar-
gain for and obtain the surface owner's consent.
The statute will apply only when someone other than the
mineral owner has a substantial interest in the surface of the
land. As the term "surface owner" is defined, 145 written consent
would have to be obtained from, among others, the owner of a,
fee simple interest, a vested remainderman, or a tenant. If two
or more persons fit the definition, then all would have to agree.
It should not matter whether the interest claimed is recorded or
not; even the consent of an adverse possessor with an unma-
tured right would be required.
The surface owner must consent if the mining operation
might "substantially interfere" with his or her use.146 This re-
quirement is actually a statutory definition of the term "reason-
able and necessary." It is clearly not the purpose of the Act to
prevent the recovery of the minerals in every case in which the
surface and mineral owners fail to enter into an express agree-
ment. The parties are understood to have contemplated that
each should have the full use and enjoyment of his property.
Similarly, the conditions described in the Act"7 represent limits
beyond which the parties cannot reasonably be thought to have
silently consented.
With the exception of very small surface tracts, the statute
permits a mining operation to affect up to ten acres of land
without the separate consent of the surface owner."' That area
is probably large enough (even with some allowance for access
roads and some supporting facilities) to permit the operation of
almost any deep mine if tailings are put back in the ground and
processing takes place elsewhere. Two or three acres is enough
for any but the deepest oil wells. 46 It is not known yet how
much of the surface will be occupied for in situ gasification or
145. Id. § IV. E..
146. Id. § IV. A..
147. Id. §IV. B..
148. Id. § IV. B. 1.. The Colorado Mined Land Reclamation Act provides relaxed stan-
dards for issuance of a permit to mine tracts of less than ten acres. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 34-
32-110 and -111 (Supp. 1978).
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chemical leaching operations, but the total required is appar-
ently small. The limitation of ten aggregate acres out of any
larger tract is designed to prevent "checkerboarding" or open-
ing of the surface at several separated locations.
The smallest landowners are protected by a requirement
that the disturbance of more than one-quarter of the surface
estate would require the owner's consent, even if the area repre-
sented by that fraction is less than ten acres.'50 It seems reason-
able to demand tangible proof of such an owner's agreement to
an activity which would effectively displace him from his land.
While the figure of one-fourth could perhaps be set higher or
'lower, it probably reflects the reasonable expectations of the
surface owners in a large number of cases.
The consent of the surface owner is required if the affected
surface area cannot be restored to its original condition, or if
the mineral owner is unwilling to restore it.5 ' This limitation
complements the various regulatory statutes that require recla-
mation of mined lands. Once again the necessity for use of the
surface by the mineral owner is recognized as temporary; the
permanent destruction of any portion of the surface is funda-
mentally inconsistent with the right of the surface owner to use
and enjoy his estate in perpetuity.
If the surface owner has any expectation that the land will
be mined, he must assume that the mining will continue for a
long enough time to permit the extraction of all the minerals.
Again, however, there are reasonable limits to such expecta-
tions. Since the mining process at a single site may extend over
several lifetimes, and since the mineral owner often has the
ability to adjust the rate of recovery, a clear understanding
should be required if occupancy of the surface could extend
over a term so long that it would be equivalent to ownership. A
period of ten years is suggested as the greatest length of time
that any owner would, without some explicit agreement, expect
to be displaced from his land.' 51
The surface and mineral owners are also required to agree
expressly to the destruction of valuable permanent improve-
149. For example, an ordinance of the City of Los Angeles permits drill sites not ex-
ceeding two acres. Los Angeles, Cal. Ordinance 112, 524, described in 4 H. WILLUMS, OIL
AND GAS LAW § 697.10, at 556 (1979).
150. Model Act, § IV. B. 2..
151. Id. § WY. B. 3.. Several states now have statutes requiring restoration of an oil and
gas drilling site, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-132a (1976).
152. Model Act, § IV. B. 4..
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ments to the surface. '53 It is not reasonable to suppose that the
surface owner would have assented to their destruction without
comment. It should not matter that the improvements pro-
tected were constructed after the severance of the surface and
mineral estates. As a reflection of the reasonable expectations
of the parties, the construction and maintenance of such im-
provements is simply inconsistent with the notion that they
could be immediately and arbitrarily destroyed by the mineral
owner.
It is important to note that the limitations just described
operate as alternatives. In other words, the mineral owner must
obtain the surface owner's consent if any one of the limitations
is exceeded. The Model Act will not, of course, eliminate all
problems of proof. When disputes arise over the possibility that
an operation would "substantially interfere," fairness requires
that the burden of proof be placed upon the mineral owner,
since he controls the choice of mining methods and, hence, the
extent of interference.1 54
Form and Content of the Consent. The current surface
owner or any previous surface owner during his tenure of owner-
ship may furnish the required consent. The mineral owner,
therefore, can be sure that once he has obtained a proper con-
sent he will not be forced to negotiate again with a new surface
owner. The parties must memorialize their agreement in a writ-
ten statement that can be recorded in the public deed
records. 15  The agreement must be notarized and otherwise con-
form to the requirements for such documents. No less pomp
and circumstance should attend the conveyance of a right to
use or destroy the surface of the land than the transfer of any
other interest in real property. The Act may thus be character-
ized as a variation of the Statute of Frauds.
The surface owner's signature must appear on the docu-
ment describing the parties' correlative rights, unless those
rights are adequately described in the conveyance that severs
the mineral and surface estates and transfers the surface rights
to the surface owner. It is probably fair to infer consent from
his or her acceptance of the conveyance in which the conditions
are plainly stated. Although both parties to a mineral lease
commonly affix their signatures to show their assent to cove-
nants in the lease, the grantee of an interest in real property
153. Id. § IV. A., B. 5..
154. Id. § IV. C..
155. Id. § V. A..
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rarely signs the granting instrument.'8
No special words or phrases are prescribed. The only re-
quirement is to clearly describe the result of the mining opera-
tion. Because the surface owner is concerned with the condition
of the land after mining, and only incidentally with any partic-
ular mining process, it is not necessary to mention the process.
Thus the mineral owner is free under the Act to take advantage
of advances in mining technology or changes in market condi-
tions. The consent must, however, contain an exact description
of the land affected by the mining.15 Only in this way can the
surface owner identify an area of the surface where he may
make improvements without risk of their destruction. If the
mineral owner is uncertain about the most desirable location
for his operation, the burden of such uncertainty is properly
borne by the party best able to resolve it by the selection of a
particular mining technique or by an engineering decision to
conduct the operation at one or another location.' 8 Similarly,
the parties must agree on the length of time that the surface
owner will be displaced from his land. '59
The condition of the land after mining must be described
in the consent. ' The description may be in negative terms, for
example, that the land will have no commercial value or useful-
ness. An explicit description is necessary to ensure that the par-
ties were aware of and bargained for the consequences of their
agreement. A mere waiver of damages for injury to the surface
estate gives the surface owner no reason to suspect the nature
or extent of such injury, and thus will not constitute compli-
ance with the statute.16'
Notice to Third Parties and Recordation. If the parties to
the instrument of severance have an express, but unrecorded,
agreement concerning the use or destruction of the surface, the
law in many jurisdictions presently requires others who may be
concerned with the land to guess at the content of that under-
standing. This doubt is resolved by requiring the consent pre-
scribed by the Act to be placed in the public record.' 2 Purchas-
156. E.g., Frensley v. White, 208 Okla. 209, 254 P.2d 982 (1953); Fleming v. Cohen, 186
Mass. 323, 71 N.E. 563 (1904). None of the enacted statutes makes this exception.
157. Model Act, § V. B. 1..
158. The general common law rule is, however, that unless he acts arbitrarily, the min-
eral owner may select a site without regard for the convenience of the surface owner. Read-
ing & Bates Offshore Drilling Co. v. Jergensen, 453 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
159. Model Act § V. B. 2..
160. Id. § V. B. 3..
161. Id. § V. C..
162. Id. § VI.
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ers and lenders may confidently invest in the land with the
knowledge that their investments will not be unexpectedly lost
through the activities of the mineral owner.
Prospective and Retrospective Application. In general,
statutes are presumed to operate prospectively unless a con-
trary intent is clearly stated or unless the inference is strong
that the change in policy embodied by the statute is applicable
to prior as well as to subsequent cases. 1 3 The Model Act has as
its purposes the promotion of fairness between parties and the
advancement of a broad public interest in clarifying their re-
spective rights. These concerns clearly are present with respect
to earlier as well as later transactions. Moreover, these concerns
exist currently for vast areas of land now held in divided owner-
ship. The retrospective operation of the Act is therefore clearly
stated."4
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The constitutional questions raised by existing legislation and
by the Model Act are not unfamiliar. They are present to some
degree in every effort by a state to regulate dealings between pri-
vate parties. A comprehensive discussion of these issues, however,
is beyond the scope of this Article. The following is rather an at-
tempt to highlight the issues, and to provide a framework for their
analysis and possible solutions.
A. Retroactivity
The United States Constitution contains no explicit prohibi-
tion of retrospective legislation, 6' and although courts have com-
monly regarded such enactments with suspicion, 6' they have inter-
preted neither the contract clause nor the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment to prohibit such enactments. ' The Model
163. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LFGAL PRoCESS: BASic PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPUCATION OF LAW 649 (tent. ed. 1958).
164. Model Act § VII.
165. League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156 (1902). However, the constitutions of some states
specifically forbid retroactive enactments.
166. Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627 (1829), suggests that retrospective legis-
lation "is an exercise of power, which is so summary a nature, . . . that a [I]egislature in-
vested with the power can scarcely be too cautious or too abstemious in the exertion of it."
Id. at 656. Consider Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S.
290 (1967), that a judicial decision having retroactive effect has been described as a taking
without due process of law where it constituted "a sudden change in state law unpredictable
in terms of relevant precedents." Id. at 296.
167. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17 (1977). The due process
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Act plainly defines the rights of parties to deeds and leases in exis-
tence on the date of enactment, as well as those arising in the fu-
ture. It is, therefore, expressly retrospective as well as prospec-
tive."6 8 Enacted legislation in several states apparently also
operates retrospectively. The Tennessee statute, for example, re-
quires written consent from the current surface estate owner if such
consent was not obtained earlier. '69
It is arguable that the consent requirement offends the consti-
tutional prohibition of ex post facto laws. This provision, however,
has been held to apply only to criminal statutes""0 or to civil acts
that are essentially penal in their operation.'71 Of the various acts
under consideration, only the Montana Landowner Notification
Act' imposes any penalty for failure to obtain the required con-
sent, other than denial of a surface mining permit.'
B. Contract
Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution provides that
"[n]o State shall. . . pass any. . . Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts." Even in the absence of any express agreement be-
tween the parties, it is arguable that the common-law dominance
doctrine gives rise to rights which are contractual in nature and
which are protected by this provision.' 74 The dominance doctrine,
however, does not apply to any current understanding between the
parties, or to any continuing obligation of performance by either
party.7 1 It does result in an implied easement of necessity, created
clause of the fourteenth amendment generally does not prohibit retrospective civil legisla-
tion, unless the consequences are particularly "harsh and oppressive." Id. at n.13; Welch v.
Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938).
168. Model Act, § VII. In the absence of such provision, statutes are ordinarily con-
strued as being prospective only in their application. Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149
(1964).
169. TENN. CODE ANN. § 58-1544(a)(6)(B) (1978).
170. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
171. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138-39 (1810).
172. MoNr. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 50-1301 to -06 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
173. Each one does, however, impose penalties for mining without a permit. The
Model Act avoids even this sanction by making the consent requirement self-enforcing by
the parties involved. The applicability of the ex post facto rule is discussed in Haughey &
Gallinger, Legislative Protection of the Surface Owner in the Surface Mining of Coal Re-
served by the United States, 22 RoCY MTN. MiN. L. INST. 145 (1976).
174. The scope of such rights will, of course, depend upon limitations of the dominance
doctrine itself by decisions within a given jurisdiction. "[T]he laws which subsist at the time
and place of the making of a contract, and where it is to be performed, enter into and form a
part of it, as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms." Von Hoffman v.
City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 550 (1866).
175. There is, to be sure, an obligation on the part of the mineral owner not to unrea-
sonably interfere with the surface owner's use of his estate, and on the part of the surface
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by operation of law, which is occasioned solely by the physical rela-
tionship of the parties. '76 The respective rights of the parties to use
the land are dependent on their respective property rights, not on
any obligation separate and apart from the land.' Because the
consent statutes govern property rather than contractual interests,
the contract clause should have no application.'
If, however, the relationship is characterized as a contractual
one the constitutional protection will extend only to an agreement
"by which perfect rights, certain, definite, fixed private rights of
property, are vested."' 7 ' The mineral owner's implied right to use
the surface, whether or not augmented by the kind of general lan-
guage found in the broad-form deeds, hardly fits that description.
It is difficult to imagine a right less certain or definite than that
described by the "reasonable and necessary" rule.
In applying the contract clause the Supreme Court has made
mutuality of understanding the central issue: "The term 'contract'
is used in the Constitution in its ordinary sense, as signifying the
agreement of two minds . . . to do, or not to do, certain acts. Mu-
tual assent to its terms is of its very essence."'8 0 The benefit pro-
tected by the Constitution is one that is "bargained for."'"' Yet it is
precisely the absence of a clear and demonstrable mutual under-
standing that gives rise to the problems addressed by the consent
statutes. In the recent case of Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Span-
naus,'"' the Court struck down a state act which imposed a "com-
pletely unexpected liability" upon one of the contracting parties,
severely disrupting his contractual expectations. But we cannot be
sure that a mineral owner has any expectation to use one or an-
owner not to interfere with the mineral owner in the exercise of his rights. However, these
undertakings are like obligations of any property owner to use his property in a way that will
not unreasonably interfere with the use and enjoyment of his neighbors' properties; they are
inherent in the ownership of property.
176. Professor Powell suggests that fictional implications of "intent" to grant or reserve
a way of necessity are genyinely rooted in considerations of public policy to prevent land
from remaining unusable. 3 R. PowLL, supra note 3.
177. Cf., Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cushman, 108 U.S. 51, 64-65 (1883) (rights
under a mortgage, protected by the contract clause, are distinguished from rights connected
with the purchase of land, which are not).
178. Clement Nat'l Bank v. Vermont, 231 U.S. 120 (1913); North Missouri R.R. v.
Maguire, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 46 (1873). On the other hand, contract rights, if they exist, are a
form of property for constitutional purposes. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431
U.S. 1, 19 (1977).
179. Butler v. Pennsylvania, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 402, 416 (1850). See also Ochiltree v.
Iowa R.R. Co., 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 249, 252 (1875).
180. Louisiana v. Mayor and Adm'rs of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285, 288 (1883). See
Garrison v. City of New York, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 196, 203 (1874).
181. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 18 (1977).
182. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
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other mining method unless he or she clearly expresses this point.
Nor can the mineral owner be said to have relied upon any ability
to use a particular method.1 8 When a particular method is clearly
stated, of course, so that a meeting of the minds can be shown, the
Model Act does not apply.8 4
It is well settled that an act of the legislature may, as an exer-
cise of the police power, have the effect of altering or even negating
the terms of a contract.'85 It may, for example, properly require the
agreement to be in writing."8 6 It may, impose a limitation on the
183. The element of reliance, or the lack thereof, was vital to the decision in City of El
Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965). "We do not believe that it can seriously be contended
that the buyer was substantially induced to enter into these contracts on the basis of [a
particular expectation]." Id. at 514. It can hardly be contended that a mineral owner expected
to engage in a destructive mining practice, when he failed to express such a fundamental
infringement upon the surface owner's rights. This is especially true if the mining technique in
question was not in use when the surface and mineral estates were separated.
184. The Act, however, could affect parties who do have a clear and unequivocal,
though unwritten, understanding. It might also apply to a relationship in which there really
is a fair disagreement about what was intended. The Kentucky Court of Appeals invoked the
contract clause to strike down that commonwealth's statute requiring the surface owner's
consent to strip mine. Department for Natural Resources & Environmental Protection v. No.
8 Ltd., 528 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1975). The court found that the language of the "broad-form"
deed under which the mineral owner claimed its interest, granting broad surface rights and
waiving damages, constituted a contract between the owners, and that the consent require-
ment impermissibly impaired the resulting obligation. The deed of severence in that case,
dated 1907, conveyed "the right to enter upon said lands, use and operate the same and
surface thereof in any and every manner that may be necessary or convenient for mining.
The grantee, its successors and assigns, was released from liability or claim of damages."
Each of the grantors signed with an "X." The contract issue was also raised, but not ex-
pressly resolved, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), in which the right
of subjacent support was expressly reserved to the mineral owner. In a similar case, the
Tennessee statutes, see text accompanying notes 92 and 129 supra, have recently been found
not to violate the contract clause:
[T]he Tennessee Surface Owner Protection Act of 1977 is a legislative codification of a
basic principle of contract law; namely, that the intention of the parties to an instru-
ment shall prevail. The Act creates an orderly and reasonable procedure for determin-
ing the intention of the parties where it is not clearly shown on the face of the deed.
Doochin v. Rackley, No. 7410 (Ch. Tenn., filed Dec. 14, 1979) (notice of appeal has been
given in this case). The Kansas court has taken another tack in holding that a statute re-
quiring reclamation of oil and gas well sites did not affect an earlier lease contract between
mineral and surface owner. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-132(a) (1976). Rather, the court said, it is
a valid act of the legislature in the public interest which affects "the abandonment and
quitting of the lease by the lessee." Decker v. Jones, 194 Kan. 146, 148, 398 P.2d 325, 327
(1965).
185. "The States must possess broad power to adopt general regulatory measures with-
out being concerned that private contracts will be impaired, or even destroyed, as a result."
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977). See also Allied Structural
Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978); City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497
(1965); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Stephenson v. Binford,
287 U.S. 251 (1932); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905).
186. Stitt v. Huidekopers, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 384 (1873); Clarke v. Russel, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 415 (1799).
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time available for performance.'87 Or it may require the observance
of certain formalities, such as recordation.' 5 The legislative power
must, however, be exercised upon reasonable conditions, and the
resulting legislation must be of a character appropriate to the pub-
lic purpose justifying its adoption. ' The impairment of a contract
between mineral and surface owner may be constitutional if it is
"reasonable and necessary to serve an important public pur-
pose."'' 0 Requiring total clarity in describing the parties' rights is
reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances."' Growing
shortages of energy (and various mineral raw materials) and in-
creasing pressure for the use of destructive mining methods have
created an emergency which warrants drastic legislative action."'
C. Equal Protection
Like almost every piece of social or economic legislation, the
application of the consent statutes will affect different persons dif-
ferently."' To fall under the proscription of the equal protection
clause, however, a statute must create a classification wherein per-
sons similarly circumstanced are treated discriminatorily.14 Al-
though the consent requirements may seem to favor surface owners
as a class over mineral owners, or to favor mineral owners who also
187. Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 163 (1850). The Model Act requires consent
if the surface owner will be deprived of any part of his estate for longer than ten years.
Model Act § IV B. 4..
188. Vance v. Vance, 108 U.S. 514 (1883); Jackson v. Lamphire, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 280
(1830). The Model Act requires the consent to be in recordable form, and to be recorded if it
is to be binding on third parties. Model Act, §§ IV, V, VI.
189. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977); Home Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
190. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977). In Department for
Natural Resources & Environmental Protection v. No. 8 Ltd., 528 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1975),
the court misread legislative history when it found the primary purpose of the Kentucky
consent statute to be environmental conservation (it appeared as part of a broader regula-
tory scheme to regulate strip mining of coal). Because it was ineffective as an environmental
conservation measure, in the court's view, it did not achieve any public purpose and thus
impermissibly interfered with private obligations. Id. at 686-87.
191. See text accompanying notes 77-85 supra.
192. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1977). The Court
in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 249 (1978), suggests that the exis-
tence of a great emergency, though not prerequisite, may help to justify the legislature's
action in the public interest.
193. Perfect equality is not required. Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U.S. 137 (1925). "Legisla-
tion designed to promote the general welfare commonly burdens some more than others. The
owners of the brickyard in Hadacheck, of the cedar trees in Miller v. Schoene, and of the
gravel and sand mine in Goldblatt v. Hempstead, were uniquely burdened by the legislation
sustained in those cases." Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 133
(1978).
194. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 30-32 (1885).
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hold title to the surface estate, they create no inherent advantage
in one form of ownership as compared with another. All owners
have generally the same rights and remedies concerning the use of
their properties, just as all are subject to certain rights of their
neighbors and to the power of the state to enact reasonable regula-
tions with respect thereto." 5
The Constitution does not prevent a state from distinguishing,
selecting, and classifying objects of legislation, provided that its
classification is reasonable, and not arbitrary.19 Such a classifica-
tion must rest upon some ground of difference which has a fair and
substantial relation to the legislative purpose."7 Each of the stat-
utes discussed in this Article is intended to alleviate problems re-
sulting from uncertainty about the correlative rights of surface and
mineral owners. If the statutes place a greater burden on the min-
eral owner, it is because he is in the better position to effect a solu-
tion by eliminating the uncertainty. He alone can anticipate the
need to employ a particular mining process and the extent of possi-
ble interference with the surface owner's use. It is appropriate,
therefore, to require him to achieve and document an understand-
ing with the surface owner concerning their respective rights, in ac-
cordance with his needs.198
195. In Northern Illinois Coal Corp. v. Medill, 397 Ill. 98, 72 N.E.2d 844 (1947), the
Illinois Supreme Court struck down that state's surface mining permit law, on the grounds
that it wrongfully restricted coal mining, while the equally destructive extraction of other
minerals went unregulated. Accord, Sigety v. State Board of Health, 157 Mont. 48, 482 P.2d
574 (1971). The same argument has not prevailed in other cases. See, e.g., Maryland Coal &
Realty Co. v. Bureau of Mines of State, 193 Md. 627, 69 A.2d 471 (1949); Dufour v. Maize,
358 Pa. 309, 56 A.2d 675 (1948). Note that, unlike the statutes in the various states which
regulate mining of only one or a limited number of minerals, the Model Act would discrimi-
nate between owners only on the basis of the destructive potential of their activities. In this
sense, the analogy of the Model Act to the zoning laws is a close one.
196. Flemming v. Nester, 363 U.S. 603 (1960); Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings
Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1898); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897).
197. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920). In Christman v. Emineth,
212 N.W.2d 543 (N.D. 1973), the court struck down as unconstitutionally arbitrary and dis-
criminatory a statute which required a full description of coal deposits reserved to grantors,
but did not require such a description of coal deposits conveyed. Such a distinction was
found to have no reasonable basis in the achievement of the avowed legislative purpose (in
this case to aid tax assessors in valuing coal deposits). Id. at 552. See Fleck, Severed Mineral
Interests, 51 N.D.L. Rav. 369 (1974). Requiring the surface owner's consent may not, of
course, be a perfect solution. Yet the existence of other possible solutions, or of a more
nearly comprehensive solution, will not necessarily invalidate a particular statute. Jefferson
v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); South Caro-
lina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). The social and economic issues involved are many
and complex, and no single answer could be expected to resolve all of them.
198. The mere fact that compliance by the mineral owner may in some instances be
cumbersome or dilatory or expensive will not necessarily render the requirement invalid. See
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1885).
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Statutes that require the consent of the "current" surface own-
er or that provide for compensation in lieu of the consent may be
perceived as vulnerable to attack under the equal protection
clause. They seem to discriminate between a mineral owner who
has the consent of the current surface owner, and a mineral owner
who obtained the same consent from the current surface owner's
predecessor in title. If the mineral owner has reached a clear under-
standing with a previous surface owner, the purposes of the consent
statute will not be furthered by requiring him to pay a second time
for the privilege of using a destructive mining process. If, on the
other hand, the term "current surface owner" is interpreted to al-
low the consent of any surface owner during his tenure of ownership,
the policies underlying the statutes would be satisfied and the
equal protection complaint would be avoided. Given the courts'
preference for constitutional rather than unconstitutional construc-
tions, the latter interpretation should be favored. The Model Act
contains clear language admitting the consent of the current sur-
face owner's predecessor in title.99
D. Taking or Regulation
Whether there is a taking in the constitutional sense depends
upon whether the application of a statute adversely affects some
interest in property. The question is complicated by the fact that
there are two distinctly different, yet related, kinds of interest
which may be so affected-the ownership of the minerals and the
easement implied by the dominance doctrine. In the absence of an
express agreement between surface and mineral owner, the latter's
right of access to the minerals cannot be greater than that de-
scribed by the implied easement. Recent decisionses have so re-
stricted the scope of that easement that a consent statute might
not limit its enjoyment in any way. Since the statute will not affect
the mineral owner's interest in the mineral deposit itself and since
it may not further restrict the scope of the easement, a property
interest would not be adversely affected and there would, therefore,
be no taking. It is most likely, however, that the courts will simply
lump these two kinds of interests together in deciding whether the
mineral "rights" have been wrongfully taken.21'
199. Model Act § V. A..
200. See text accompanying notes 69-74 supra.
201. None of these statutes, except perhaps the compensation provisions, see text ac-
companying notes 99-102 supra, seems to restrict the rights of any surface owner. It may be
fairly asked whether the compensation statutes really provide "just compensation," or
whether a taking thereunder is for a public purpose. By permitting the mineral owner to
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A state can, of course, exercise its police power to regulate the
use of property for the purpose of protecting the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare, even though such regulation has
the effect of diminishing the value of the property regulated."' In
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,"3 Justice Holmes remarked that
"Government hardly could go on if, to some extent, values incident
to property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law."2 4 Whether a regulation should be char-
acterized as a taking, requiring payment of compensation, depends,
according to Justice Holmes, upon the extent of diminution in
value compared with the benefit resulting to the public from the
regulation."5 That determination depends, in turn, upon the facts
in each case. Although Justice Holmes' oft-quoted balancing test
does not appear to have been widely followed in the Supreme
Court2 0 either before or after Mahon, no other reliable guide has
been developed.0 7 In the recent case of Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. City of New York,"'5 the Court admits that it "has been
unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice
and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action
be compensated by the government.""2 Yet one can draw some ten-
tative conclusions about the validity of the consent statutes.
appropriate directly from the surface owner, these laws may stretch even the considerable
limits of Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). Only under the Pennsylvania notice statute,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52 § 1406.15 (Purdon 1979 Supp.), is compensation provided for the
mineral owner. See note 135 supra.
202. If a statute can be characterized as a valid exercise of the police power, it will
overcome any objections of taking of property without due process. Powell v. Pennsylvania,
127 U.S. 678 (1888); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.)
504 (1847); Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851). When such a regulation is
founded upon the common-law doctrine of nuisance, it has been characterized by Professor
Haar as a "nontaking" of the properties surrounding the property regulated. Lectures by
Professor Haar, Harvard Law School (1975). Similarly, the consent statute may represent a
"nontaking" of the surface owner's property.
203. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
204. Id. at 413.
205. "When [the diminution in value] . . . reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not
in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the
act." Id. at 413. Professor Michelman restates the proposal in economic terms in Property,
Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law,
80 HAnv. L. REv. 1165, 1214 (1967).
206. An excellent survey of the taking cases in the Supreme Court may be found in F.
BOSSELMAN, D. CALLiEs, & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 114-235 (1973).
207. "Despite the intensive efforts of commentators and judges," observes Professor
Sax, "our ability to distinguish satisfactorily between 'takings' . . . and exercises of the
police power. . . has advanced only slightly since the Supreme Court began to struggle with
the problem some eighty years ago." Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81
YALE L.J. 149, 149 (1971).
208. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
209. Id. at 124.
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The mere fact that a regulation may deprive a property owner
of the most valuable use of his estate, for instance, will not neces-
sarily result in a compensable taking.210 The mineral owner cannot
be heard to complain if he is compelled by a statute to resort to, for
example, shaft and pillar mining, in situ gasification, or leaching to
recover minerals, when strip mining would be more profitable, as
long as the restriction is necessary to effect a substantial public
purpose. It is also unlikely that the mineral owner has a protected
right in any particular mining process, provided that process is not
the only one by which he may "use" his property.211 A strict read-
ing of the dominance doctrine does not require that result. Because
the mineral owner must act with "due regard" for the rights of the
surface owner,1  the existence of alternative methods of extraction
may make the use of a particular process unreasonable, hence not a
"property interest" for these purposes. 213
The question of whether a mineral owner is guaranteed a profit
from his property was addressed by Justice Holmes in Mahon:
"What makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exer-
cised with profit. To make it commercially impracticable to mine
certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional pur-
poses as appropriating or destroying it. ' '214 The Penn Central court
interprets this language to mean that an otherwise valid statute
may constitute a taking if it unduly frustrates "distinct invest-
210. Id. at 130. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); United
States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Re-
alty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Powell v. Penn-
sylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Johnson v. United
States, 479 F.2d 1383 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
211. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978); Gold-
blatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
212. See note 53 supra.
213. 438 U.S. at 126-27 (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962)).
In Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 530, 20 Cal. Rptr.
638, 647, 370 P.2d 342, 351 (1962), the court observed that the owner prevented from contin-
uing his gravel pit operation could use his property for "stabling horses, cattle feeding and
grazing, chicken raising, dog kennels, fish hatcheries, golf courses, certain types of horticul-
ture, and recreation."
214. 260 U.S. at 414. While a number of state courts have adopted this test, e.g.,
Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954); Arverne
Bay Const. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938), it has not been followed in
the Supreme Court. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888); Mugler v. Kan-
sas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). The subjective nature of such a test may raise problems of fairness,
as well as difficult administrative questions. For example, who is to decide what is profit-
able, and on what grounds? Should the decision to permit destruction of the surface be
based upon the fluctuating price of a mineral or the availability of a more or less costly
mining technology? What of the mine operator's capital strength or operating efficiency?
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ment-backed expectations."2 '5 Of course, if the "investment-backed
expectation" is the implied right to totally destroy the surface es-
tate, or even to substantially interfere with the surface owner's use,
that expectation may not be warranted and may not be pro-
tected." ' The point is clearly made in Penn Central: "[T]he sub-
mission that appellants may establish a 'taking' simply by showing
that they have been denied the ability to exploit a property interest
that they heretofore had believed was available for development is
quite simply untenable. '217
Moreover, it appears that a consent statute can validly deprive
the mineral owner of the total use of his property without compen-
sation as long as the deprivation represents a proper exercise of the
police power. 218 In his dissent in the Mahon case, Justice Brandeis
suggested that "[r]estriction upon use does not become inappropri-
ate as a means merely because it deprives the owner of the only use
to which the property can then be profitably put. 219 The later
holdings in Miller v. Schoene20 and Goldblatt v. Town of Hemp-
stead21 clearly support this view.
All of the statutes discussed in this Article have the broad
public purposes 2 2 of promoting fairness in dealings between surface
215. 438 U.S. at 124.
216. There was no suggestion in Mahon that the Pennsylvania statute absolutely pre-
vented removal of the mineral owner's coal. But its removal was made "commercially im-
practicable" (would not result in profit) because of the requirement to protect the surface
estate from subsidence. It seems fair to ask whether the coal company's "expectation" of
recovering all the coal at a profit was warranted, in view of Pennsylvania's long recognition
of a common-law right of subjacent support. See notes 20-23 supra and accompanying text.
217. 438 U.S. at 130 (emphasis added).
218. See Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887). But see Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971),
suggesting that "any governmental regulation that makes a private right essentially worth-
less is a taking of property for which compensation must be paid." Id. at 152.
219. 260 U.S. at 418.
220. 276 U.S. 272 (1928). The case involved a Virginia statute which required the de-
struction of one landowner's cedar trees to prevent the infection of a neighboring apple
orchard with a plant disease called cedar rust. The Court, relying on the Hadacheck case,
stated, "Where the public interest is involved preferment of that interest over the property
interest of the individual, to the extent even of its destruction, is one of the distinguishing
characteristics of every exercise of the police power which affects property." Id. at 279-80.
221. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
222. The purposes described in the Model Act, § I, are all matters in which the pub-
lic has a strong and legitimate interest. See City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1964);
Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189 (1936); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502,
525-30 (1934). The possibility that a statute would incidentally benefit some individual land-
owners while others are burdened will not cause it to fail, in view of the predominantly
public character of its purpose. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.. 393, 417-18
(1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Furthermore, "a large discretion is necessarily vested in the
legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but what mea-
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and mineral owners,12 removing uncertainty in the law, reducing
litigation, facilitating planning, stabilizing economic relationships,
and encouraging the most efficient use of land.2 4 All of these con-
cerns are legitimate objects for legislative action. Furthermore, the
requirement of an explicit agreement (or some lesser requirement,
such as compensation) has a "real and substantial relation to the
object sought to be attained, ' '2 2 and seems reasonably adapted to
the accomplishment of these purposes, without being arbitrary or
oppressive."'
The reasonableness of the consent requirement may be tested
in part by the gravity of the harm it seeks to avoid. Even if it fails
to accomplish all of its objectives,2 2 or frustrates the reasonable ex-
pectations of some well-meaning mineral owners, 2 1 it can hardly be
thought of as arbitrary or oppressive. Indeed, large mineral pur-
chasers have for many years voluntarily employed practices pursu-
ant to which they would be in substantial compliance with the
terms of the Model Act and many of the state statutes. More im-
portant, as we have seen, the courts which have squarely faced this
problem have been increasingly reluctant to give the mineral owner
carte blanche, in the absence of a clear understanding, to use the
surface.
V. CONCLUSION
The Model Act is intended to promote stability, predictability,
and fairness in the relations between surface and mineral owners.
sures are necessary for the protection of such interests." Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136
(1894). See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907);
Chicago B. & Q. Ry. v. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906).
223. The prevention of fraud, deceit, cheating, and imposition has long been regarded
as a legitimate concern of the legislature. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888); Kuhl
Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 270 Wis. 488, 71 N.W.2d 420 (1955). The regulation of a
particular business may be justified because its very nature encourages fraud by those en-
gaged in it. State v. Memorial Gardens Dev. Corp., 143 W. Va. 182, 191, 101 S.E.2d 425, 430
(1957). If surface mining does not exactly fit that description, certainly confusion about the
law and inequality in bargaining power have encouraged some to take unfair advantage.
224. See text accompanying notes 77-85 supra.
225. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). The problems addressed by these
statutes are directly attributable to the failure of surface and mineral owners to clearly and
completely state their intentions concerning the use of the surface.
226. Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189, 197 (1935). See also Indiana v.
Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894). See notes 189-92
supra and accompanying text.
227. Mathematical precision is not possible, but neither is it required. Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
228. The benefits to the public generally from resolution of uncertainty in the law
make any such burden justifiable. East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 235
(1945); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
1980]
918 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:871
It is no panacea, however. Neither the Model Act nor any of the
enacted statutes will totally eliminate uncertainty or avoid fraud
and overreaching. Yet the Model Act represents a significant ad-
vance. Its enactment would almost surely result in improved un-
derstanding, greater satisfaction of justifiable expectations, and a
fuller and more efficient use of all of our natural resources.
